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COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIVE WORKS AND 
FIXATION: IS GALOOB A MIRAGE, OR DOES THE 
FORM(GEN) OF THE ALLEGED DERIVATIVE 
WORK MATTER? 
Tyler T. Ochoat 
ABSTRACT 
The Copyright Act gives a copyright owner the exclusive right 
"to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work." Does 
the Copyright Act require that a derivative work be "fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression" in order to be infringing? Existing 
case law is contradictory, stating both that a derivative work does not 
need to be "fixed" but that it does need to be embodied in some 
"concrete or permanent form." This contradiction stems from the fact 
that although the statutory language does not appear to require 
fixation, reading the statutory language literally would render illegal 
merely imagining a modified version of a copyrighted work. This 
contradiction can be eliminated by recognizing that what Congress 
intended was to prohibit the public performance of an unfixed 
derivative work, as well as the reproduction, public distribution, 
public performance or public display of a fixed derivative work. 
Congress' intent can be fully implemented by holding that the 
exclusive right to prepare derivative works is dependent upon, rather 
than independent of, the other four exclusive rights. The advantage of 
this interpretation is that it leaves all private performances of a 
derivative work, whether fixed or unfixed, outside the realm of 
copyright infringement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a person sits down at a piano and creates a new 
arrangement of a popular song. Later, he performs the new 
arrangement for some friends in the privacy of his home. Has he 
infringed the copyright in the musical work? Does it matter if he 
writes the arrangement down instead of memorizing it?1 
Suppose another person cuts a photograph out of a book, mounts 
it upon a ceramic tile, and displays the mounted photo in her home. 
Has she infringed the copyright in the photograph?2 Does it make a 
difference if she places a transparent piece of pink plastic over the 
photograph before displaying it?3 What if she paints the photo with 
pink watercolor instead of framing it with pink plastic?4 What if she 
offers the pink-framed photo for sale at her local swap meet, or on the 
Internet?5 
Suppose a company creates an electronic device that alters the 
display of a popular video game. A teenager plays the video game in 
his home while using the device. Has he infringed the copyright in 
I .  This hypothetical assumes that the musical arrangement is sufficiently original to 
constitute a derivative work. Compare Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 989-93 (2d Cir. 
1995) (affirming district court's finding that piano-vocal arrangement and other printed and 
performed arrangements, with one exception, were not sufficiently original to qualify as 
derivative works) with Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1 62,  167-69 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that creating harmony for an existing melody may, in some instances, 
be sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection). The question posed is whether 
infringement depends upon the fixation of the derivative work, or upon the fact that it was only 
performed in private. 
2. Compare Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1 34 1 ,  1 343-44 
(9th Cir. 1988) (yes) with Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997) (no). 
3. This variation is based upon a hypothetical posed by Judge Kozinski in Micro Star v. 
FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1 107, 1 1 1 1  n.4 (9th Cir. I 998) (the "Pink Screener"). 
4. See Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F. Supp. 2d 2 1 6 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (application of 
paint to mounted poster was an infringing reproduction, but was not sufficiently original to 
constitute a derivative work), aff'd in relevant part, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 47 
Fed. Appx. 597 (2d Cir. 2002). 
5. This variation raises the issue of public distribution and display of the alleged 
derivative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 06(3), (5) (2000). But see 17 U.S.C. § \09(a), (c) (first-sale 
doctrine). It also raises the further issue, which will not be discussed in detail here, of third­
party liability for the owner of the swap meet or the internet service provider. Compare 
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1 996) (swap meet owner may be 
contributorily and vicariously liable for sale of infringing items) with Adobe Sys., Inc. v .  Canus 
Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1 044 (C.D. Cal. 200 I )  (finding genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether operator of trade show was contributorily or vicariously liable for sale of infringing 
items) and 17 U.S.C. § 5 1 2  (limitation of liability for Internet service providers). 
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the video game? If so, is the device manufacturer liable for 
contributory infringement? 6 
Finally, suppose that a person watching a videotape or DVD at 
home fast-forwards through certain parts of a movie, or presses the 
mute button during playback. Has she infringed the copyright in the 
movie? Suppose instead that a company sells software that 
automatically instructs the VCR or DVD player to skip over certain 
portions of the movie or to mute certain words. If the same person 
uses the software while watching the movie, has she infringed? If so, 
is the company liable for direct or contributory infringement? 7 
What these four situations have in common is that each involves 
the alleged preparation of a derivative work in the privacy of one's 
home, and each involves a potential question of whether the alleged 
derivative work is "fixed" in a tangible medium, and therefore 
"reproduced," within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 8 Thus, in 
each case the same legal question is presented: is the private 
preparation of a derivative work, in the absence of any fixation of that 
derivative work, a copyright infringement? 
In this article, I contend that the proper answer in each of the 
four basic situations outlined above is that the person has not 
infringed the copyright in the underlying work. Part II of this article 
examines the role of fixation in copyright law generally. Part III 
analyzes the exclusive right to prepare derivative works and the case 
law interpreting that right. Part IV suggests an alternative 
interpretation of the Copyright Act that would achieve more 
consistent results in cases of this type; and Part V applies this new 
interpretation to each of the four situations outlined above. 
II. THE ROLE OF FIXATION IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "to Promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by granting to Authors and 
Inventors for limited Times the exclusive right to their respective 
6. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v .  Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967-69 (9th 
Cir. 1 992) (no). But see Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at I I 1 0-12 (distinguishing Ga/oob where 
instructions for altering the display were fixed in software instead of enabled by an electronic 
device). 
7. This hypothetical describes the operation of software currently offered for sale by 
Clear Play, the legality of which has been challenged in a pending action. See infra notes 224-
25 I and accompanying text. 
8. For definitions of these terms, see supra notes 1 2-26 and accompanying text. 
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Writings and Discoveries.,,9 The term "Writings" has been construed 
broadly to mean "any physical rendering of the fruits of creative 
intellectual or aesthetic labor.,,10  In the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
Constitutional requirement of a physical rendering is found in the 
statutory requirement of fixation in a tangible medium. II 
Section 102 of the Copyright Act grants copyright protection to 
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.,,12 Under section 101, "[a] work 
is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in 
a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration. ,,1 3 
Copyright law draws a distinction between the work (an 
intangible intellectual creation in which copyright subsists) and the 
tangible object in which the work is fixed. 14 "Copies" are defined as 
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed,
1 5 
and "phonorecords" are defined as material objects in which sounds 
are fixed.1 6  Thus, for example, a "literary work" is an intangible 
sequence of words or symbols, which may be fixed in one or more 
"copies" (such as a manuscript, a book, a reel of microfilm, or a 
computer disk) and/or in one or more "phonorecords" (such as a 
9. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For the historical background of the Clause, see Tyler 
T. Ochoa and Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins o/the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'y U.S. 675 (2002). 
1 0. Goldstein v. California, 4 1 2  U.S. 546, 561  ( 1 973) (emphasis added). 
I \ , Cf United States v. Moghadam, 1 75 F.3d 1 269, 1 280 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 999) (referring to 
"the fixation requirement inherent in the tenn 'Writings'" and "the fixation requirement of the 
Copyright Clause"); id. at 1281-82 (referring twice to "the fixation requirement of the 
Copyright Clause"). 
1 2. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 02(a) (2000). 
13. 1 7 U.S.C. § IO I .  
14. ld. § 202 ("Ownership of a copyright . . .  is distinct from ownership of any material 
object in which the work is embodied."). The statute appears to use the word "embodied" as a 
synonym for the word "fixed." 
1 5. ld. § 10 1 .  
16. ld. The definition of "phonorecords" excludes sounds accompanying a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, id., so material objects in which both sounds and images are 
fixed are classified as "copies" rather than "phonorecords." 
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cassette tape or a CD).1 7 "A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a 
copy or phonorecord for the first time,,,1 8 and copyright attaches at the 
moment of creation.19 Thus, federal copyright law does not protect 
works that exist only in an author's mind, and which have not yet 
been committed to paper, to film, to disk, or to some other tangible 
medium.2o 
Copyright protection consists of five exclusive rights set forth in 
section 106, which are subject to various limitations and exclusions in 
sections 107 through 122?1 Fixation plays an important role in 
defining the first, third and fifth of these exclusive rights. The first 
exclusive right, for example, is the right "to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.,,22 As seen above, the 
terms "copies" and "phonorecords" are both defined as material 
objects in which the work is fixed?3 Thus, the right of reproduction is 
really the ri ght to produce new fixations of the copyrighted work, i.e., 
the right to fix the work in any material object.24 Copyright 
infringement is defined as the unauthorized exercise of any of the 
1 7. ld. (,"Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, 
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects . . .  in which they are embodied."). 
1 8. ld. 
1 9. 1 7  U.S.c. § 302(a) (duration for works created on or after Jan. 1 ,  1978); Works 
created before 1978 are governed by the 1909 Act, which required either publication with notice 
or registration for federal copyright protection to attach, see Copyright Act of 1 909, ch. 320, 35 
Stat. 1 075, 1 077-78 ( 1 909). 
20. It is clear, however, that state law may protect works of authorship that are not yet 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17  U.S.C. § 301(b)( l ); H.R. Rep. 94- 1476, at 1 3 1 ,  
reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5747. Ironically, by defining "creation" in terms of 
"fixation," the Copyright Act gives rise to a semantic paradox in which state law can protect a 
work of authorship before it is "created"! 
2 1 .  1 7  U.S.c. § 1 06. There are actually six subsections, the sixth ("in the case of sound 
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by  means of digital audio transmission") 
having been added in 1995. Logically, however, the sixth subsection should have been 
implemented by adding "sound recordings" to the fourth subsection (the exclusive right "to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly"), and placing the limitation ("by means of digital audio 
transmission" only) in Section 1 14. This author, therefore, will continue to refer to the six 
subsections of section 1 06 as providing five exclusive rights. 
22. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 06( 1 ). 
23. ld. § 1 0 1 ;  see supra notes 14-17  and accompanying text. 
24. See H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 6 1 ,  reprinted in 1976 U. S.C.C.A.N. 5675 ( "Read 
together with the relevant definitions in section 1 0 1 ,  the right 'to reproduce the copyrighted 
work in copies or phonorecords' means the right to produce a material object in which the work 
is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in fixed form"). 
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exclusive rights.25 Thus, any unauthorized fixation of the work is an 
infringement of the exclusive right of reproduction. 2 6 
The third exclusive right is the right "to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending.,,27 Again, the 
terms "copies" and "phonorecords" are defined as material objects in 
which the work is fixed;28 thus, the public distribution right envisions 
that material objects containing the work will be distributed to the 
pUblic?9 Under the first-sale doctrine, once copies or phonorecords 
have been distributed by sale or other transfer of ownership, the 
copyright owner's exclusive right ceases with respect to those copies 
or phonorecords: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 1 06(3), 
the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under 
this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, 
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord. ,,30 
"Distribution" is synonymous with "publication," which is 
defined as "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or 
lending.,, 3 l The Act contemplates that works will be "published" in 
the manner that books are traditionally published: copies (or 
phonorecords) will first be fixed, and then the fixed copies (or 
phonorecords) will be distributed to the public. In an electronic 
world, of course, distribution occurs in the reverse order: bits of 
digital information are transmitted from one location to another and 
25. 1 7  U.S.C. § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner as provided in sections 1 06 through 122 . . .  is an infringer of the 
copyright . . . .  "). 
26. Although the definition of "fixed" includes the phrase "by or under the authority of 
the author," 1 7  U.S.c. § 1 0 1 ,  this clause is nonsensical in the context of infringement, which by 
definition is an unauthorized exercise of any of the exclusive rights. Thus, the limitation "by or 
under the authority of the author" is properly read as applying only to the initial fixation of the 
work for purposes of copyright protection; and not to any fixations which are alleged to 
constitute an infringement. 
27. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 06(3). 
28. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
29. See R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright A ct's Neglected 
Solution to the Controversy Over "RAM Copies, "  2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 1 26-27. 
30. 1 7  U.S.c. § 1 09(a). There are two exceptions: the owner of a copy of a computer 
program or of a phonorecord may not rent, lease or lend that copy or phonorecord "for the 
purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage" without the authorization of the copyright 
owner, except in limited circumstances. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 09(b). 
3 1. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 0 1  (defining "publication"). 
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are fixed at the receiving end. 32 The end result is that copies of the 
work wind up in the hands of the public, even though no material 
objects have ever changed hands, as the language of the Act seems to 
require. 3 3  Despite this theoretical difficulty, courts have not been 
troubled in concluding that digital transmission is a distribution, and 
therefore a "publication," within the meaning of the Act. 34 
The fifth exclusive right is the right "to display the copyrighted 
work publicly.,, 35 This right does not seem on its face to be limited to 
fixed copies. However, the term "display" is defined in section 101 
as follows: "[t]o 'display' a work means to show a copy of it, either 
directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other 
device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.,, 3 6 
Thus, the act of display necessarily involves at least one fixed "copy" 
of the work which is being displayed. 3? The actual viewing of the 
display, however, can occur indirectly though means that do not 
32.  This manner of distribution necessarily results in a reproduction, as there is a new 
fixation of the copyrighted work on the receiving end. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With 
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 547, 556-57 ( 1997). In 
addition, as the transmission occurs by copying the data from computer to computer along the 
internet transmission network, courts have found that there are multiple "RAM copies" (and 
therefore multiple reproductions) of the work created during the transmission. See Reese, supra 
note 29, at 138-46 (describing and criticizing existing case law). The fact that these 
intermediate fixations have no independent economic significance has not deterred copyright 
owners from suing internet service providers for infringement, in addition to (or instead of) the 
person making the transmission. See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for 
Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. LJ. 
1 833, 1 838-80 (2000). Copyright law has responded by limiting the liability of internet service 
providers if they comply with a long list of restrictive conditions. See 17  U.S.C. § 5 1 2. For an 
evaluation of § 5 1 2, see Yen, supra, at 1 88 1 -89. 
33. See Reese, supra note 29, at 1 26-38. The material object in which the work is fixed 
at the receiving end is typically a hard disk on a computer. While a hard disk is a "copy" (a 
tangible object in which the work is fixed), this transaction does not involve the physical 
transfer of the hard disk from one person to another, as contemplated by the statute. 
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (200 1 )  (concluding without 
analysis that "LEXISINEXIS, by selling copies of the Articles through the NEXIS Database, 
'distribute copies' of the Articles 'to the public by sale"'); Getaped.com v. Cangemi, 1 88 F. 
Supp. 2d 398, 40 1-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (collecting cases); cf Agee v. Paramount 
Communications, Inc., 59 F.3d 3 1 7, 324-26 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that a satellite 
transmission is not a "distribution," but reserving the question of Internet transmissions). 
35. 17 U.S.c. § 106(5). 
36. 1 7  U.S.C. § 10 1 .  
37. Note that since the public display right does not extend to sound recordings, 17  
U.S.c. § 106(5), the definition of "display" applies only to a "copy" and not to a "phonorecord." 
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require any additional fixation (such as a television transmission). 38 
Indeed, because the first-sale doctrine expressly permits the owner of 
a particular copy to display that copy "to viewers present at the place 
where the copy is located,,, 39 infringement of the public display right 
is effectively limited to the unauthorized transmission of an image of 
the work to viewers at a remote location.40 
The fourth exclusive right is the right "to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly.''''l The word "perform" is defined without 
reference to fixation.42 Consequently, a copyrighted work may be 
infringed by an unauthorized, unfixed public performance of the 
work, as well as by an unauthorized fixation (reproduction) or by an 
unauthorized public distribution, public performance or public display 
of one or more fixed copies. 
III. DERIVATIVE WORKS AND FIXATION 
A. Text and Legislative History 
The second exclusive right is the right 
works based upon the copyrighted work.,,4 3 
work" is defined in section 101 as follows: 
"to prepare derivative 
The term "derivative 
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting 
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work 
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
38. See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 
879 (S.D. Fla. 1978) ("[T]he term 'display' includes showing a 'copy' of the work via tele­
vision."), ajJ'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1 1 7 1  ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 980). 
39. 17 U.s .C. § 1 09(c). 
40. See Reese, supra note 29, at 88-92. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista 
Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321 ,  332  (D.N.J. 2002) (internet transmission of images 
constitutes a public display), ajJ'd on other grounds, 342 F.3d 1 9 1  (3d Cir. 2003); Playboy 
Enters ., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1 552, 1 556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (display of copyrighted 
photographs on computer bulletin board service). 
4 1 .  17 U.S.C. § 1 06(4). As explained above, I am including within the ambit of this right 
the sixth exclusive right, the right to perform a sound recording publicly "by means of digital 
audio transmission." Id. § 106(6); see supra note 2 1 .  
42. 1 7  U.S.C. § 10 1  ("To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, 
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying 
them audible ."). 
43. Id. § 1 06(2). 
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modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a "derivative work.,,44 
A lawfully-made derivative work is entitled to a separate copyright,45 
which extends only to the new material in the derivative work (as 
opposed to the preexisting material).4 6  
Like any other work, a derivative work must be fixed in a 
tangible medium in order to be protected by copyright.47 Because the 
same statutory definition applies both to copyrightable (authorized) 
derivative works and infringing (unauthorized) derivative works, it 
has been argued that the Act also requires that a derivative work be 
fixed in order to be infringing.48 The argument runs as follows: a 
derivative work is a "work," and a work is not "created" until "it is 
fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time. ,,49 Therefore, 
"preparation of a derivative 'work' entails embodying the plaintiffs 
copyrightable composition in some type of fixed form.,,50 This 
conclusion would be unassailable if section 106(2) provided the 
exclusive right to create derivative works; however, that section uses 
the undefined word "prepare" instead of the word "create.,,51 The 
avoidance of the word "create" (which is defined in terms of fixation), 
together with the absence of the terms "copies" and "phonorecords" 
and the absence of any other reference to fixation, strongly suggests 
that the right to prepare derivative works can be infringed without any 
additional fixation of the copyrighted work.52 
This conclusion is reinforced by the House Report to the 1 976 
Act, which indicates in several places that it is possible to have a 
44. !d. § 1 0 1 .  
45. Id. § 1 03(a). 
46. Id. § I 03(b). 
47. This result follows because section 1 03 is not independent of section 1 02. Section 
103(a) states that "[t)he subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes . . .  
derivative works," 17  U.S.C. § 1 03(a) (emphasis added); and section 1 02(a) expressly requires 
fixation in a tangible medium. 17  U.S.C. § 1 02(a). 
48. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 
8.09[A), at 8-142 (2003) ("Absent any compelling need to depart from the plain language of the 
statute, both doctrine and policy incline to the same result . . . .  [Therefore,) fixation should be 
required to infringe the adaptation as well as the reproduction right."). 
49. 17 U.S.C. § 1 0 1  ("A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for 
the first time"). 
50. 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[ A), at 8-140 n. 1 2. 1  O. 
5 1 .  See 17  U .S.C. § 106(2). 
52. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 
194 (6th ed. 2000) ("The use of different words within related statutes generally implies that 
different meanings were intended"). Students of legal history will be saddened to learn that the 
Singer treatise no longer acknowledges its origins as a revision of Sutherland's famous treatise. 
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"work of authorship" that is not fixed. 53 More specifically, the House 
Report expressly states that: 
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works, specified 
separately in clause (2) of section 1 06, overlaps the exclusive right 
of reproduction to some extent. It is broader than that right, 
however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies 
or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, 
such as a baBet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be 
an infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible 
54 form. 
Similarly, the Register's 1965 Supplementary Report states: 
[I]t is possible for a "derivative work" based on a copyrighted 
work to be prepared without being fixed in a copy or 
[phono ]record; examples are baBets, pantomimes, and impromptu 
performances. It is true that a derivative work would not itself be 
protected by statutory copyright if it were not fixed in a "tangible 
medium of expression" as required by section 102 of the bill. 
Nevertheless, since there is no requirement under the definition in 
section 1 0 1  that a "derivative work" be fixed in tangible form, 
clause (2) of section 1 06 . . .  would make the preparation of 
"derivative works" an infringement whether or not any copies or 
55 phonorecords had been produced. 
Thus, both the text of the Act and its legislative history demonstrate 
that Congress intended that a derivative work does not need to be 
fixed in order to infringe. 
Despite this seemingly straightforward conclusion, however, 
consider the difficulties that would arise from accepting this literal 
reading of the statute. If fixation is not required, that means that the 
preparation of any unfixed derivative work, even only in one's own 
mind, would be a prima facie infringement of the copyright in the 
underlying work.5 6 If, in your mind's eye (or ear), you imagine an 
53. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1 476, at 53, reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5666 ("It is 
possible to have an 'original work of authorship' without having a 'copy' or 'phonorecord' 
embodying it."); id. at 1 3 1 ,  1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5747 ("[Sjection 301(b) explicitly preserves 
common law copyright protection for one important class of works: works that have not been 
'fixed in any tangible medium of expression. '''). 
54. H .R. Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675. 
55. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1 965 REVISION BILL, at 
1 7  (May 1965). 
56. Cf Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 1 3  CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.1. 29, 
38 n.44 ( 1994): 
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original arrangement of a popular song, or you imagine an altered 
version of a copyrighted work of art, or you imagine your favorite 
action movie with Johnny Depp in the lead role instead of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger57 (or vice versa), 58 under this interpretation of the 
statute you would be a copyright infringer. 59 While no one would be 
aware of your transgression unless and until you revealed it to 
someone else, and while it is all but certain that you would not be 
sued even if the copyright owner became aware of such musings, "[a] 
definition of derivative work that makes criminals out of art collectors 
and tourists [and imaginative thinkers] is jarring despite [plaintiffs] 
gracious offer not to commence civil litigation.,, 6o 
B. Case Law 
1. Unfixed Modifications to a Copyrighted Work 
Courts have shown some reluctance to accept the literal reading 
of the Act that renders all unfixed derivative works infringing. A 
prime example is Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, 
Inc. ,61 which involved the Game Genie, "a device manufactured by 
Galoob that allows the player to alter up to three features of a 
Nintendo video game.,, 62 The court explained that "[t]he Game Genie 
functions by blocking the value for a single data byte sent by the 
game cartridge to the central processing unit in the Nintendo 
In theory, the police officer who succumbs to temptation and imagines the film 
[INTERVIEW WITH THE VAMPIRE] as it might have looked if Daniel Day Lewis 
had been cast in Tom Cruise's role may be violating the copyright owners' 
exclusive rights under 17  U.S.C. § 1 06(2) to prepare derivative works, since a 
violation of the derivative wor� right requires no tangible embodiment 
whatsoever. 
57. See, e.g., THE TERMINATOR (Orion 1984). 
58. See, e.g., PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Disney 
2003). 
59. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22 (200 1)  ("[qurrent law may make it 
technically illegal to watch a movie and then imagine what it would have looked like if the 
studio had cast some other actor in the leading role."); id. at 32 n. 1 (Right to prepare derivative 
works "include[ s] any adaptation in any form, regardless of whether that adaptation is ever 
embodied in a permanent copy or communicated to another human being."). 
60. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1 997) (Easterbrook, J.). Such an 
interpretation might also raise serious constitutional problems. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom 
oJ lmagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 1 1 2 YALE L.1. 1 , 39 (200 1)  (propounding a First 
Amendment theory based on the freedom of imagination, because "in America no one can be 
punished for daring to conceive or express an unauthorized idea."). 
6 1 .  964 F .2d 965 (9th Cir. 1 992). 
62. Id. at 967. 
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Entertainment System and replacing it with a new value.'.6 3 However, 
as explained more fully in a previous, unpublished appeal: 
The Game Genie makes no change in the data stored in the game 
cartridge. Its interception and substitution of data takes place only 
as long as it is attached to the game cartridge and the [Nintendo] 
controller's power is on. The individual changes that the user 
makes through entering codes therefore alter the audiovisual 
display temporarily but do not change it or the Nintendo game 
permanently.64 
Because no fixed "copy" of the altered display was created, use of the 
Game Genie did not violate the reproduction right.65 The issue was 
whether the altered screen display created when a Nintendo video 
game cartridge was played using the Game Genie constituted an 
infringing derivative work of that game.6 6  
The Galoob court expressly stated that "[0 ]ur analysis is not 
controlled by the Copyright Act's definition of 'fixed' .. .. The 
definition of a 'derivative work' does not require fixation.,, 6 7  
Nonetheless, the court held that "[a] derivative work must incorporate 
a protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form. ", 68 The court 
explained that "[t]he examples of derivative works provided by the 
63. Id. 
64. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 923 F.2d 862, No. 90- 1 5936, 1991  
WL 5 1 7 1 ,  a t  ** 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 1 99 1 ); see also Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967 ("The Game Genie 
does not alter the data that is stored in the game cartridge. Its effects are temporary."). 
65. One might question this assumption today, by noting that the object code of the video 
game had to be transferred into the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the Nintendo controller 
(which is merely a special-purpose computer) in order to play the game; and that by intercepting 
and substituting data obtained from the game cartridge, an altered version of the object code 
would be utilized in RAM while the game was being played. Virtually all courts that have 
addressed the issue have concluded that a RAM version of a work is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to be considered "fixed " within the meaning of the Act, and therefore to constitute a 
"copy" and to violate the reproduction right if unauthorized. See, e.g., Stenograph L.L.c. v. 
Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 1 0 1--02 (D.C. CiT. 1998); MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 99 1 F.2d 5 1 1 ,  5 1 8  (9th CiT. 1 993). In this analysis, the RAM memory chip 
itself is considered the tangible object in which the work is fixed-notwithstanding the fact that 
the electronic version of the work would vanish if the flow of electricity to the RAM were 
turned off. Despite widespread academic criticism of this view, see, e.g., Lemley, supra note 
32, at 55 1 n.25 (collecting articles); Reese, supra note 29, at 138-46; Litman, supra note 56, at 
40-42, Congress appears to have implicitly adopted the thesis that a RAM version of a work is a 
"copy" by providing a number of express exceptions for various electronic versions of a work. 
See, e.g., 17  U.S.C. §§ I 17(c), 5 12(a). In Galoob, however, neither party argued that a copy of 
the altered screen displays was fixed in RAM. 
66. 964 F.2d at 969 ("[T]he only question before us is whether the audiovisual displays 
created by the Game Genie are 'derivative works.'''). 
67. Id. at 967--68. 
68. Id. at 967 (emphasis added). 
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Act all physically incorporate the underlying work or works. The 
Act's legislative history similarly indicates that 'the infringing work 
must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form. ", 69 
The court's conclusion is self-contradictory: the requirement of 
"concrete or permanent" incorporation is nothing more than fixation 
by another name.70 In addition, its reasoning is weak. While it is true 
that the examples of derivative works given in the statutory definition 
all incorporate the underlying work in some way, it is meaningless to 
say that they physically incorporate the underlying work without 
further defining what "physically" means. If "physical" means 
concrete or permanent, as the court suggests, the qualification is 
simply untrue: a musical arrangement, for example, can exist in a live 
performance without being preserved permanently (i.e., without being 
fixed), as can a dramatization. If "physical" means "tangible," that is 
simply another synonym for "fixed.,,71 Moreover, the legislative 
history states only that a derivative work must incorporate a portion 
of the copyrighted work in some form; 72 it does not state that it must 
incorporate the copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent 
form. 
Applying its new-found requirement of concrete or permanent 
incorporation, the Galoob court concluded that: 
The Game Genie merely enhances the audiovisual displays (or 
underlying data bytes) that originate in Nintendo game cartridges. 
The altered displays do not incorporate a portion of the 
copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent/orm. Nintendo 
argues that the Game Genie's displays are as fixed in the hardware 
69. Id., quoting 1 976 U.S.C.C.A. N .  5675. 
70. See 17  U.S.c. § lOl (2000) ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression 
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . .  is sufficiently permanent or stable . . . .  ") 
(emphasis added); see also Edward G. Black and Michael H. Page, Add-On Infringements: 
When Computer Add-Ons and Peripherals Should (and Should Not) Be Considered Infringing 
Derivative Works Under Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., and Other Recent 
Decisions, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 615, 623 ( 1 993) (referring to "[t]his apparently 
self-contradictory requirement"); id. at 625 ("Having discarded the fixation requirement . . .  [the 
Ninth Circuit] found an independent fixation requirement of sorts built into the statutory 
definition of derivative works. "); 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[A] at 8-14 1  ("[E]ven after 
rejecting fixation as an infringement prerequisite, the opinion several times slid back towards 
fixation as a required standard. "). 
7 1. See 17  U.S.C. § lOl ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression . . . .  ") 
(emphasis added). 
72. See H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1 476, at 62, reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A. N. 5675 ("[T]o 
constitute a violation of section I 06(2), the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the 
copyrighted work in some fonn; for example, a detailed commentary on a work or a program­
matic musical composition inspired by a novel would not nonnally constitute infringements 
under this clause. "). 
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and software used to create them as Nintendo's original displays. 
Nintendo's argument ignores the fact that the Game Genie cannot 
produce an audiovisual display; the underlying display must be 
produced by the Nintendo Entertainment System and game 
cartridge. Even if we were to rely on the Copyright Act's 
definition of 'fixed,' we would similarly conclude that the resulting 
display is not 'embodied,' see 17 U.S.C. § 101, in the Game Genie. 
It cannot be a derivative work.73 
It is clear that the court's requirement that a derivative work have 
some "concrete or permanent" form affected the outcome.74 The 
altered screen displays unquestionably incorporated the Nintendo 
screen displays; indeed, they consisted of nothing but the Nintendo 
screen displays behaving or moving in a different manner. But the 
altered displays did not exist in any "concrete or permanent" form, 
because they persisted only so long as the game was being played. 
Circuit Judge Pamela Rymer concurred in the judgment only, 
"for [the] reasons stated by the district court." 75 The district court 
expressly required that a derivative work be fixed in order to be 
infringing: 
[T]his Court concludes that inherent in the concept of a "derivative 
work" is the ability for that work to exist on its own, fixed and 
transferable from the original work, i.e., having a separate ''form.'' 
The Game Genie does not meet that definition . ... No 
independent, fixed work is created?6 
The district court distinguished Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic 
International, Inc.77 in which "the allegedly infringing product was a 
printed circuit board which could be used to speed up the rate of 
play ... of one of plaintiffs video games ('Galaxian'),,, 78 as follows: 
Midway's result, if not its analysis, appears to have turned on the 
fact that the licensee arcade owner, not the copyright holder, was 
making money from the public perfonnance of the altered game, a 
violation of section 106(4) .... 
73. 964 F.2d at 968. 
74. Indeed, the Galoob court repeated the "concrete or permanent" requirement, mantra­
like, four times in three pages. /d. at 967-69. 
75. Id. at 972 (Rymer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
76. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991), affd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1 992) (citation omitted). 
77. 704 F .2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983). 
78. Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1290. 
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The alleged infringer in this case is not a commercial licensee, 
but rather a consumer utilizing the Game Genie for 
noncommercial, private enjoyment. Such use neither generates a 
fixed transferable copy of the work nor exhibits or performs the 
k fi . 1 . 79 wor or commercIa gam. 
This passage contains three potential grounds on which the 
Midway case could be distinguished. The first, commercial gain 
versus noncommercial use, does not affect whether a prima facie case 
of infringement exists; rather, it is relevant (if at all) only to the fair 
use doctrine.8o The second, whether a "fixed transferable copy" is 
made, is the issue that the Court of Appeals discussed at length.81 The 
third, whether the performance of the altered video display was a 
public or a private performance, ostensibly also does not affect 
whether an infringing derivative work has been "prepared. ,,82 The 
district court, however, found the private character of the alleged 
derivative work to be significant (and in the process anticipated a 
current copyright controversy): 
The Game Genie is a tool by which the consumer may temporarily 
modify the way in which to play a video game, legally obtained at 
market price. Any modification is for the consumer's own 
enjoyment in the privacy of the home. Such a process is analogous 
in purpose, if not in technology, to skipping portions of a book, 
learning to speed read, fast-forwarding a video tape one has 
purchased in order to skip portions one chooses not to see, or using 
slow motion for the opposite reasons. None of these practices 
permanently modifies or alters the original work, none produces a 
separate work which can then be transferred in any way, none 
replaces the original work, and none deprives the copyright holder 
of current or expected revenue.83 
In concluding that "none [of these practices] produces a separate 
work," the district court appears to confuse the intangible work with 
the tangible copy. The Game Genie does not contain or produce a 
79. Id. at 1 2 9 1 .  
80. See 17 U.S.C. § \07 (2000) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-( I) the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes . . . .  "). 
8 1 .  See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
82. Compare 1 7  U.S.C. § 106(2) (exclusive right "to prepare derivative works") with § 
\06(3) (exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public '" § 1 06(4) (exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly '" and § 106(5) 
(exclusive right "to display the copyrighted work publicly', (emphases added). 
83. 780 F. Supp. at 129 1 .  
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separate copy (a material object) of the copyrighted work, which 
could then be transferred; but whether the altered screen displays are 
a separate work (an intangible intellectual creation) is the question to 
be decided. And although the court found that the copyright holder 
would not be deprived of current or expected revenue, the effect on 
the market is supposed to be relevant, if at all, only to the fair use 
doctrine.84 Nonetheless, the analogy is an apt one, and it raises the 
issue (to be discussed further in Part IV, below) whether the private 
performance of an unfixed derivative work is, or should be, 
infringing. 
Finally, the district court also suggested that the Game Genie 
could be characterized as instructions (in the form of software)85 for 
creating an altered screen display: 
Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the copyright laws, 
for a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how 
to modify the rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game. 
Once having purchased, for example, a copyrighted board game, a 
consumer is free to take the board home and modify the game in 
any way the consumer chooses, whether or not the method used 
comports with the copyright holder's intent. The copyright holder, 
having received expected value, has no further control over the 
, . . f h 86 consumer s prIvate enjoyment 0 t at game. 
This passage again raises several potential issues that bear on the 
question of whether a derivative work has been prepared. One is 
whether a set of instructions for the private preparation of a derivative 
work is itself a fixation of the resulting work. The district court 
concludes that it is not. The second relates to the idea/expression 
dichotomy, the fundamental principle that a copyright protects only 
the expression of an idea, and not the idea, procedure, process, system 
or method of operation itself.S? If the rules of a board game (or the 
"behavior" of a video game) are considered part of the idea or method 
of operation, then instructions or a device that alter only the 
unprotected idea or method of operation, rather than its expression 
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 1 07 ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include . . .  (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."). 
85. See 1 7  U.S.C.S. § 1 0 1  ("A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions 
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."). 
86. 780 F. Supp. at 1 29 1 .  
87. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work."). 
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(such as the appearance of the board game, or the artwork of the video 
game), should not be infringing. This analysis raises a very difficult 
line-drawing problem, since the way in which a video game character 
moves (for example) could be considered either part of the expression 
or part of the idea. The third potential issue is the relationship of the 
right to prepare derivative works to the first sale doctrine. Can a 
person who has purchased a lawfully-made copy of a copyrighted 
work permanently alter or modify that copy without the permission of 
the copyright holder? That question has been addressed in a trio of 
cases to which we now tum. 
2. Mounting and Framing a Copyrighted Work of Art 
Under the first-sale doctrine, if a person buys a painting, he or 
she becomes the owner of that tangible object,88 and he or she can 
lend or resell that painting,89 or display that painting publicly to 
persons who are physically present,90 without the permission of the 
copyright owner. The buyer, however, does not acquire the right to 
reproduce the copyrighted work.91 This result is accomplished in the 
statute by making the first-sale doctrine an express exception to the 
distribution and display rights,92 but not to the reproduction right. 
Likewise, the first-sale doctrine does not expressly apply to the 
right to prepare derivative works. If a very crass person bought a 
painting and painted a moustache on it, would doing so infringe the 
copyright in the painting? We need not answer this specific question, 
because in the case of a painting or other "work of visual art," the 
author has the moral right of integrity provided in section 106A.93 
That section gives the author a non-transferable right "to prevent any 
88. See id. § 1 0 1  ("The term 'copies' includes the materia l object . . .  in which the work is 
first fixed."). 
89. See id. § 1 09(a). 
90. See id. § 1 09(c). 
9 1 .  See id. § 202 ("Transfer of ownership o f  any material object, including the copy or 
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the 
copyrighted work embodied in the object. "). 
92. See 1 7  U.S.C. § i09(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) . . . . "); § 
1 09(c) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1 06(5) . . . .  "). There is also a limited first­
sale provision which permits the public performance and display of "an electronic audiovisual 
game intended for use in coin-operated equipment" without the permission of the copyright 
holder in the game. See id. § 109(e). 
93. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 33, 35 n. l ( 1997) ("It has become standard fare in moral-rights 
conversation to discuss the painting of a mustache on the Mona Lisa."); see also Geri J. 
Yonover, The "Dissing" of Da Vinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp: Moral 
Rights, Parody and Fair Use, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 935 ( 1995). 
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intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work 
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation,,94 and 
provides a civil action to enjoin (or to recover damages for) any 
violation of that right.95 However, the term "work of visual art" is 
very narrowly defined: it applies only to a single original painting, 
drawing, print, or sculpture, or "a still photographic image produced 
for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed 
by the author," or to a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer of any of 
the above that are signed and consecutively numbered.9 6 We can 
therefore remove the limited moral right provided by U.S. law from 
the equation by changing our hypothetical to a photograph published 
in a book. Suppose a person buys an illustrated catalog (published in 
more than 200 copies) at a museum exhibition of an artist's work. 
Can he or she paint a moustache on one of the photographs in the 
catalog? 
An initial reaction might be "of course"; after all, the book is a 
tangible piece of personal property (a "copy"), and under the first-sale 
doctrine, the person owns that copy and can do what he or she wants 
with it. This was the reaction of the Seventh Circuit in Lee v. A.R. T. 
Co. ,9 7 in which the defendant purchased notecards bearing printed 
works of art, mounted each notecard on a ceramic tile using an epoxy 
resin, and sold the finished tiles.98 The court said: 
Now one might suppose that this is an open and shut case under 
the doctrine of first sale, codified at 17 U.S.c. § 109(a). AR.T. 
bought the work legitimately, mounted it on a tile, and resold what 
it had purchased. Because the artist could capture the value of her 
art's contribution to the finished product as part of the price for the 
original transaction, the economic rationale for protecting an 
adaptation as "derivative" is absent. See William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J. 
Legal Studies 325, 353-57 (1989). An alteration that includes (or 
consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic 
significance. One work changes hands mUltiple times, exactly 
what § 109(a) permits, so it may lack legal significance too.99 
94. 1 7  U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
95. See id. § 501 (a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights . . .  of the author 
as provided in section 1 06A(a) . . .  is an infringer of the . . .  right of the author."). 
96. !d. § 1 0 1 .  In the case of a sculpture, the limited-edition copies may bear an 
identitying mark instead of a signature. ld. 
97. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). 
98. ld. at 580. 
99. ld. at 58 1 .  
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But the artist might reply: "Not so fast. The first-sale doctrine is only 
an exception to the rights of public distribution and public display. It 
does not provide any exception to the right to prepare derivative 
works, and painting a moustache on the photograph is the preparation 
of a derivative work." 
The Ninth Circuit essentially agreed with this analysis in Mirage 
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R. T. Co. ,  100 in which the defendant 
purchased a book of prints by the artist Patrick Nagel and mounted 
the individual pages in the same manner as in Lee. t O t  The Mirage 
court held: 
We recognize that, under the "first sale" doctrine . . . , appellant 
can purchase a copy of the Nagel book and subsequently alienate 
its ownership in that book. However, the right to transfer applies 
only to the particular copy of the book which appellant has 
purchased and nothing else. The mere sale of the book to the 
appellant without a specific transfer by the copyright holder of its 
exclusive right to �repare derivative works, does not transfer that 
right to appellant. t 2 
The question, therefore, was whether mounting the art print onto a 
ceramic tile amounted to the preparation of a derivative work. Or, in 
the more colorful language of the Seventh Circuit: 
. . .  Lee believes that affixing the art to the tile is "preparation," so 
that A.R.T. would have violated § 1 06(2) even if it had dumped the 
finished tiles into the Marianas Trench. For the sake of argument 
we assume that this is so and ask whether the card-on-a-tile is a 
"derivative work" in the first place. 103 
In Mirage, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the mounted prints 
were derivative works: 
What appellant has clearly done here is to make another version of 
Nagel's art works, and that amounts to preparation of a derivative 
100. 856 F.2d 1341  (9th Cir. 1 988). 
1 0 1 .  The Mirage court gave a more detailed explanation of the process: 
Since 1984, the primary business of appellant has consisted of: I )  purchasing 
artwork prints or books including good quality artwork page prints therein; 2) 
gluing each individual print or page print onto a rectangular sheet of black plastic 
material exposing a narrow black margin around the print; 3) gluing the black 
sheet with print onto a major surface of a rectangular white ceramic tile; 4) 
applying a transparent plastic film over the print, black sheet and ceramic tile 
surface; and 5) offering the tile with artwork mounted thereon for sale in the 
retail market. 
[d. at 1 342. 
1 02. /d. at 1 344. 
103. Lee, 125 F.3d at 5 8 1 .  
HeinOnline -- 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1011 2003-2004
2004] COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIVE WORKS & FIXATION 1011 
work. By borrowing and mounting the preexisting, copyrighted 
individual art images without the consent of the copyright 
proprietors . . .  appellant has prepared a derivative work and 
infringed the subject copyrights . . . .  The language "recast, 
transfonned or adapted" seems to encompass other alternatives 
besides simple art reproduction. By removing the individual 
images from the book and placing them on the tiles, perhaps the 
appellant has not accomplished reproduction. We conclude, 
though, that appellant has certainly recast or transfonned the 
individual images by incorporating them into its tile-preparing 
104 process. 
This passage is remarkably devoid of analysis; the court simply 
repeats its conclusion three times, as if doing so would make its 
opinion more persuasive and comprehensible. The real question is: 
what does "recast, transformed, or adapted" mean? The court 
apparently did not believe that an "adaptation" had taken place. The 
print (the tangible object) has been "transformed" in the sense that it 
is now permanently bonded to a three-dimensional object, but the 
work (the intangible image) has not been transformed at all; it "still 
depicts exactly what it depicted" before it was mounted. I 05 The literal 
meaning of "recast" would be to reproduce or repair a sculpture (or 
other metal object) by pouring molten metal into a mold; lo 6  a more 
likely meaning in this context is "[t]o set down or present (ideas, for 
example) in a new or different arrangement."I 07 Perhaps shuffling the 
prints and presenting them in a different order would constitute a new 
arrangement of those images and would infringe the copyright in the 
collective work; I 08 but with respect to each individual copyrighted 
image, how is mounting it on a tile a new "arrangement" of the 
image?I 09 
1 04. 856 F.2d at 1 343--44. 
1 05. Lee, 125 F.3d at 582. 
1 06. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1458 (4th ed. 
2000) ("[tlo mold again") ; id. at 289 (defining "cast" as "[tlo form (liquid metal, for example) 
into a particular shape by pouring into a mold"). 
107. Id. at 1458. 
1 08. A "collective work" is a species of "compilation"; and "[al 'compilation' is a work 
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original 
work of authorship." 17  U.S.C.S. § 1 0 1  (2000). Under the Supreme Court's landmark opinion 
in Feist Publ 'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co. , 499 U.S. 340 ( 1 99 1), the copyrightable element in 
a compilation is the original selection or arrangement of preexisting materials. 
1 09. Another definition of "recast" is "[tlo refashion, remodel, reconstruct (a thing, esp. a 
literary work, a sentence, etc.); to invest with new form or character." 1 3  OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 3 1 1  (2d ed. 1 989). Using this definition, it is hard to see how mounting an image 
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In yet another case involving the same process, Munoz v. 
A lbuquerque A.R. T. CO. , 1 10 the same defendant argued that mounting 
a print on a ceramic tile was no different from placing it in a frame. 
The district court rejected this argument: 
The court cannot agree that pennanently affixing a notecard to a 
ceramic tile is not recasting, transfonning or adapting the original 
art work. Placing a print or painting in a frame and covering it 
with glass does not recast or transfonn the work of art. It is 
commonly understood that this amounts to only a method of 
display. Moreover, it is a relatively simple matter to remove the 
print or painting and display it differently if the owner chooses to 
do so. Neither of these things i s  true of the art work affixed to a 
ceramic tile. I I I 
In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
the outcome was controlled by its opinion in Mirage, and endorsing 
the district court's distinction between mounting and framing. 1 I2 But 
in Lee, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with this conclusion: 
No one believes that a museum violates § 106(2) every time it 
changes the frame of a painting that is still under copyright, 
although the choice of frame or glazing affects the impression the 
art conveys, and many artists specify frames (or pedestals for 
sculptures) in great detail . . . .  Nonetheless, the [N]inth [C]ircuit 
held, what A.R.T. does creates a derivative work because the 
epoxy resin bonds the art to the tile. Our district judge thought this 
a distinction without a difference, and we agree . . . .  If the framing 
process does not create a derivative work, then mounting art on a 
tile, which serves as a flush frame, does not create a derivative 
work. What is more, the [N]inth [C]ircuit erred in assuming that 
nonnal means of mounting and displaying art are easily reversible. 
A painting is placed in a wooden "stretcher" as part of the framing 
process; this leads to some punctures (commonly tacks or staples), 
may entail trimming the edges of the canvas, and may affect the 
surface of the painting as well . . . .  As a prelude to framing, 
photographs, prints and posters may be mounted on stiff boards 
on a ceramic tile "refashions, remodels or reconstructs" the image. Whether mounting an image 
invests the image with "new fonn or character" is more of a metaphysical inquiry. 
1 1 0. 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1 993), affd mem., 3 8  F.3d 1 2 1 8  (9th Cir. 1 994) 
(unpublished opinion available at 1 994 WL 574 1 56). 
I l l . 829 F. Supp. at 3 14. 
1 1 2. 1 994 WL 574 1 56, at **2 ("A.R.T.'s position ignores the distinction drawn in this 
circuit between conventional framing and A.R.T. 's ceramic tiling process which the district 
court properly held to constitute a derivative work."). Despite the language in the court's 
unpublished opinion, the "distinction " to which the court refers was not mentioned in Mirage 
and did not exist in any circuit precedent prior to the Munoz decision. 
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using wax sheets, but sometimes glue or another more durable 
substance is employed to create the bond. 1 1 3 
As a practical matter, the disagreement between Lee, on the one 
hand, and Mirage and Munoz, on the other, is a dispute about money: 
should the artist receive a cut of the profits when a previously sold 
work is mounted and resold at a higher price? Under the first-sale 
doctrine, the artist gets nothing if the work is resold at a higher price 
without remounting; if anything, the extra materials and labor 
involved in the mounting process justify giving the profit to the 
improver, who has added value, rather than to the artist, who has 
already received compensation for the authorized copy. I 14 
More fundamentally, however, this trio of cases exposes a flaw 
in the Copyright Act's treatment of privately prepared derivative 
works. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, "if Lee is right about what 
'prepared' means, then the derivative work is 'prepared' when the art 
is mounted; what happens later is not relevant, because the violation 
of the § 106(2) right has already occurred.,,1 1 5 Under this reading, 
even drawing a moustache on your own copy of a photograph, or 
writing notes in the margins of your own copy of a book, would be an 
infringement. As the Seventh Circuit observed: 
We asked at oral argument what would happen if a purchaser 
jotted a note on one of the notecards, or used it as a coaster for a 
drink, or cut it in half, or if a collector applied his seal (as is 
common in Japan); Lee's counsel replied that such changes 
prepare derivative works, but that as a practical matter artists 
would not file suit. A definition of derivative work that makes 
criminals out of art collectors and tourists is jarring despite Lee 's 
gracious offer not to commence civil litigation. I 16 
1 1 3 .  Lee v .  A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 5 8 1  (7th Cir. 1 997). 
1 1 4 .  One commentator suggests that this analysis will hold true only when the derivative 
use "is a customary or reasonably expected use" of the underlying work. See Amy B. Cohen, 
When Does a Work Infringe the Derivative Works Right of a Copyright Owner?, 1 7  CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 623, 658 ( 1 999). When, on the other hand, "the derivative use was not 
customary or reasonably expected and . . .  therefore there was no realistic opportunity for the 
copyright owner to receive compensation for that use, " Cohen would impose liability. Id. This 
analysis does not square with the incentive theory of copyright, because if the derivative use was 
not customary or reasonably expected, it could not have played any role in the author's decision 
to create and publish the work. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 \ 0  U.S. 569, 592 
(1 994) ("[T]he market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original 
works would in general develop or license others to develop . "). 
1 1 5 .  1 25 F.3d at 580-581 .  
1 1 6. Id. at 582. 
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Moreover, this flaw cannot be rectified by invoking the concept of 
"fixation." Mounting a print on a ceramic tile with an epoxy resin 
could be considered a "fixation" in the sense that the mount is 
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived . . .  for a 
period of more than transitory duration.,,1 1 7 Likewise, painting a 
moustache on a photo or writing notes in the margin of a book is a 
permanent change. But in each of these cases, no reproduction has 
taken place; the modification is accomplished without any new 
fixation of the underlying work, or any portion of the underlying 
work. 
Before offering an alternative interpretation of the Act that may 
resolve some of these problems, we must consider one more Ninth 
Circuit opinion involving the right to prepare derivative works. 
3 .  Software That Modifies a Copyrighted Work 
Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc. 1 1 8 involved a computer game called 
Duke Nukem 3D ("DIN-3D"), described by Judge Kozinski as 
follows: 
Players explore a futuristic city infested with evil aliens and other 
hazards. The goal is to zap them before they zap you, while 
searching for the hidden passage to the next level. The basic game 
comes with twenty-nine levels, each with a different combination 
of scenery, aliens, and other challenges. 
I 19 
Judge Kozinski also described how the game operates in detail: 
The game consists of three separate components: the game engine, 
the source art library and the MAP files . . . .  In order to create the 
audiovisual display for a particular level, the game engine invokes 
the MAP file that corresponds to that level. Each MAP file 
contains a series of instructions that tell the game engine (and 
through it, the computer) what to put where. For instance, the 
MAP file might say scuba gear goes at the bottom of the screen. 
The game engine then goes to the source art library, finds the 
image of the scuba gear, and puts it in just the right place on the 
screen. The MAP file describes the level in painstaking detail, but 
it does not actually contain any of the copyrighted art itself; 
1 1 7. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 0 1  (2000) (definition of "fixed"). It doesn't make much sense, however, 
to speak of a mounted print being able to be "reproduced" or "otherwise communicated." It is 
the intangible image that communicates and that can be reproduced; mounting the image doesn't 
reproduce the image or communicate anything new. 
1 1 8. 1 54 F.3d 1 1 07 (9th Cir. 1998). 
1 1 9. Id. at 1 109.  
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everything that appears on the screen actually comes from the art 
l·b 12<J" 1 rary. 
The game comes with a "Build Editor" which allows users to build 
new levels by creating new MAP files. 12 1 FormGen encouraged users 
to post new levels to the Internet, 122 but specified that any new levels 
"must be offered .. . solely for free.,,12 3 Micro Star downloaded 300 
user-created MAP files from the Internet, burned them onto a CD, and 
sold the resulting product under the name "Nuke It" ("Nil"). 124 
FormGen contended that "the audiovisual displays generated 
when DIN-3D is run in conjunction with the Nil CD MAP files are 
derivative works.,, 125 In assessing this claim, Judge Kozinski 
accepted as a given that "a derivative work must exist in a 'concrete 
or permanent form,' and must substantially incorporate protected 
material from the preexisting work.,,12 6 Micro Star argued that its CD 
was a more advanced version of the Game Genie: it had to be run in 
conjunction with a DIN-3D game, and it drew upon the source art 
library to create modified audiovisual displays. The court, however, 
found Galoob distinguishable: 
[W]hereas the audiovisual displays created by Game Genie were 
never recorded in any pennanent fonn, the audiovisual displays 
generated by DIN-3D from the Nil MAP files are in the MAP files 
themselves. In Galoob, the audiovisual display was defined by the 
original game cartridge, not by the Game Genie; no one could 
possibly say that the data values inserted by the Game Genie 
described the audiovisual display. In the present case the 
audiovisual display that appears on the computer monitor when a 
Nil level is played is described - in exact detail - by a Nil MAP 
file. 
This raises the interesting question whether an exact, down to 
the last detail, description of an audiovisual display . . .  counts as a 
pennanent or concrete fonn for purposes of Galoob. We see no 
reason it shouldn't. What, after all, does sheet music do but 
describe in precise detail the way a copyrighted melody 
sounds? . . .  Similarly, the Nil MAP files describe the audiovisual 
120. ld. at 1 1 1 0. 
1 2 1 .  ld. at 1 1 09. 
122. ld. 
1 23. ld. at 1 1 1 3 (alteration in original). 
1 24. Micro Star v. FonnGen, Inc., 1 54 F.3d 1 \07, 1 1 09 (9th Cir. 1998). 
1 25. ld. at 1 1 1 0. 
126. ld. (citations omitted). 
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display that is to be generated when the player chooses to play 
DIN-3D using the Nil levels. 1 27 
One may question the assertion in the second sentence quoted above: 
while perhaps no one could say that "the data values inserted by the 
Game Genie described the audiovisual display," one could certainly 
say that those values described certain aspects of the audiovisual 
display. Likewise, in Micro Star certain aspects of the audiovisual 
display were predetermined and other aspects could be altered, even 
though the technology in Micro Star permitted a much greater degree 
of modification than did the technology in Galoob. 
There is, however, a more significant distinction: the degree of 
permanence or fixation. In Galoob, the altered data values (the 
instructions for changing the audiovisual display) were entered by the 
user, so that the altered audiovisual displays disappeared at the end of 
the game.128 "Of course, they could be reconstructed, but only if the 
next player chose to reenter the same codes."129 In Micro Star, 
however, the altered audiovisual displays (or, more precisely, 
software instructions for creating the altered displays) were fixed on a 
CD-ROM in the form of MAP files. 
Judge Kozinski illustrated this point with a "low-tech" example: 
Imagine a product called the Pink Screener, which consists of a big 
piece of pink cellophane stretched over a frame. When put in front 
of a television, it makes everything on the screen look pinker. 
Someone who manages to record the programs with this pink cast 
(maybe by filming the screen) would have created an infringing 
derivative work. But the audiovisual display observed by a person 
watching television through the Pink Screener is not a derivative 
work because it does not incorporate the modified image in any 
1 30 permanent or concrete form. 
127. ld. at 1 1 1 1-12. The Micro Star opinion uses the word "display" in its ordinary lay 
sense, meaning any image displayed on the screen of a computer monitor. The Copyright Act, 
on the other hand, has a more restrictive definition of "display": "in the case of a motion picture 
or other audiovisual work, to show individual images nonsequentially." 17  U.S.c. § 1 0 1 .  Since 
the images of a video game are shown sequentially, rather than nonsequentially, in the language 
of the Act the modified audiovisual displays would be a "perfonnance" rather than a "display." 
Id. (To "perfonn" an audiovisual work is "to show its images in any sequence."). 
128. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (N.D. 
Cal. 199 1) ,  aff d, 964 F .2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
129. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at I 1 1 1  (referring to Galoob). 
130. !d. at 1 1 1 1  n.4. 
HeinOnline -- 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1017 2003-2004
2004] COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIV'E WORKS & FIXATION 1 0 1 7  
Of course, this hypothetical just highlights the fact that the Ninth 
Circuit is requiring that a derivative work be fixed in a tangible 
medium, even if that is not what they are calling it. 
Another distinction between the two cases may also be drawn. 
The Game Genie allowed the player to alter the display of any game 
that could be played on the Nintendo Entertainment System, 1 3 l 
whereas the MAP files reproduced and distributed by Micro Star 
could only be used with Duke Nukem 3D.! 32 The court in Micro Star 
found this point significant, indicating in dicta that "[i]f another game 
could use the MAP files to tell the story of a mousy fellow who 
travels through a beige maze, killing vicious saltshakers with paper­
clips, then the MAP files would not incorporate the protected 
expression of DIN-3D because they would not be telling a DIN-3D 
story."! 3 3  
This passage, however, misconstrues FormGen's basic argument 
that it is the modified audiovisual displays themselves (an unfixed 
private performance), not the MAP files per se (fixed instructions for 
generating the displays), that are derivative works.! 34 Thus, even if 
Micro Star 's MAP files could be used with other games, FormGen 
could still argue that Micro Star was contributorily liable for 
reproducing and distributing software that enabled users to generate 
and view the modified displays. Micro Star, in turn, might be able to 
argue that its MAP files were "capable of substantial non-infringing 
uses,,,J 35 at least if they could be used with games whose copyright 
owners did not object. 1 3 6 But such non-specific MAP files would be 
just as "fixed" as MAP files that could only be used with one game. 
The Game Genie is yet one more step removed from Judge 
Kozkinski's hypothetical non-specific MAP files. The Game Genie is 
a tool for temporarily implementing instructions for modifying an 
audiovisual display, whereas the MAP files are the instructions 
themselves. If someone had distributed plug-in cartridges for the 
1 3 1 .  Ga/oob, 780 F. Supp. at 1288 ("The Game Genie can function in combination with 
any NES-compatible game cartridge."). 
1 32. Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at 1 1 12 n.5 . 
133. ld. 
134. ld. at 1 1  \0 ("According to FormGen, the audiovisual displays generated when D/N-
3D is run in conjunction with the Nil CD MAP files are derivative works."). 
1 35 .  Sony Corp. of Am. v .  Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 442 ( 1 984). 
136. Cf Ga/oob, 780 F. Supp. at 1 288 ("It is not known whether the nontestifying 
Nintendo-licensees or the eight nonlicensed producers of NES-compatible games object or 
consent to the use of the Game Genie with their copyrighted games . . . .  "). 
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Nintendo system that had altered data values already stored in them 
("fixed"), the result in Galoob probably would have been different. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION 
As we have seen, there is reason to question the literal 
interpretation of the statute that makes all unfixed derivative works 
infringing, if for no other reason than it is absurd to suggest that 
merely imagining a derivative work is infringing. And yet few of us 
would question that some unfixed derivative works, such as a live 
public performance of an adaptation of a novel, should be infringing. 
How should this dilemma be resolved? As demonstrated above, the 
Ninth Circuit has attempted to resolve it by requiring that a derivative 
work incorporate a portion of the underlying work in some "concrete 
or permanent form," a requirement which appears to be nothing more 
than fixation by another name. 1 37 Such a transparent semantic dodge 
is unsatisfactory, and it contradicts the passage in the House Report 
which states that "the preparation of a derivative work . . .  may be an 
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.,,1 38 
To properly resolve the question, we must examine the purpose 
of eliminating the fixation requirement for derivative works. This 
requires a brief look at the history of the exclusive right to prepare 
derivative works. 
Under the 1 790 and 1 83 1  Acts, the copyright owner was given 
the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish, and vend" the work, and 
to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies.1 39 Courts 
construed these rights narrowly; an unauthorized German translation 
of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," for example, was held not to be an 
infringement. 140 In 1 856, Congress added a right of public 
1 3 7. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
1 38. H.R. Rep . No. 94-1476, at 62, reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675. 
139 .  Copyright Act of  1790, ch. 15 ,  §§ 1-2, I Stat. 1 24 ( 1 790); Copyright Act of  183 1 ,  ch. 
16, §§ 1 , 6, 4  Stat. 436-37 ( 1 83 1 ). 
1 40. See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 1 3 ,5 1 4). By contrast, 
the scope of infringement in images was somewhat broader. In 1 802, Congress prohibited the 
copying of prints "in the whole or in part, by varying, adding to, or diminishing from the main 
design." Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 3, 2 Stat. 172. The 1 83 1  Act both extended and limited 
the reach of this provision, prohibiting the copying of any print, engraving, map, chart or 
musical composition (but not any book) "either on the whole, or by varying, adding to, or 
diminishing the main design, with intent to evade the law." Copyright Act of 1 83 1 ,  ch. 16, § 7, 
4 Stat. 438. This language was further refined in 1 870 to prohibit copying "either in whole or in 
part, or by varying the main design with intent to evade the law." Act of July 8, 1 870, ch. 230, § 
1 00, 16  Stat. 2 1 4. In 1 89 1 ,  dramatic compositions and photographs were given the benefit of 
this provision. Act of Mar. I ,  189 1 ,  ch. 565, § 8, 26 Stat. 1 109. This language was not carried 
forward in the 1909 Act. 
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perfonnance in dramatic compositions. 141 In the 1 870 general 
revision, Congress provided for the first time that "authors may 
reserve the right to dramatize or translate their own works.,,142 In 
1 897, the right of public perfonnance was expanded to include 
musical works. 14 3 Finally, in the 1909 Act, a broad derivative work 
right was created: 
[The author] shall have the exclusive right: 
(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or 
dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; 
to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a 
novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or 
adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it 
if it be a model or design for a work of art. 1 44 
This history suggests that the principal purpose behind the right to 
prepare derivative works was to expand the scope of the reproduction 
and public perfonnance rights to include adaptations and other new 
versions of copyrighted works. The "translation" and "conversion" 
rights provided in the 1 909 Act, for example, appear to relate to the 
right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work; while the 
"dramatization" right and the "arrangement" right for musical works 
appear to relate to the public perfonnance right. Indeed, a 1 96 1  
Report of the Register of Copyrights stated "[p ]erhaps section 1 (b) is 
unnecessary," but it recommended retaining a separate right to make 
new versions "to avoid any doubt" and to ensure that the right 
covered "all classes of works and all fonns of new versions.,, 145 
1 4 1 .  Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 1 69, I I  Stat. 139 ("The sole right also to act, perform, or 
represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public 
place during the whole period for which the copyright is obtained."). 
1 42. Act of July 8, 1 870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 2 12 .  In 1 89 1 ,  this was rephrased to state 
that authors "shall have the exclusive right to dramatize or translate any of their works." Act of 
Mar. I, 189 1 ,  ch. 565, § 1 , 26 Stat. 1 1 07. 
1 43. Act of Jan. 6, 1 897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 48 1 .  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 
35 Stat. 1075, 1 077-78 ( 1 909) 
144. Copyright Act of 1 909, ch. 320, § I(b), 35 Stat. 1 075. For musical works, another 
section of the Act reiterated the right "to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody 
of it." Id. § I (e); Copyright Act of 1 909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1 075, 1 077-78 ( 1909). 
145. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REpORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (July 1 96 1 ). Similarly, the Register's  
1965 Report stated: 
It could be argued that, since the concept of "reproduction" is broad enough to 
include adaptations and recast versions of all kinds, there is no need to specify a 
separate right "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work." 
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It appears that the reason the right to prepare derivative works 
was drafted without any reference to fixation was to make sure that 
public performances of derivative works would be covered. The 
House Report to the 1976 Act gives three examples of unfixed 
derivative works: "the preparation of a derivative work, such as a 
ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an infringe­
ment even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.,,1 4 6  All three 
examples are public performances of a derivative work. There is 
nothing to suggest that Congress intended to prohibit the private 
performance of a derivative work. 
This suggests an alternative interpretation of the right to prepare 
derivative works that addresses all of the concerns expressed by 
Congress while avoiding some of the more obvious problems 
discussed above. My interpretation is simply this: the exclusive right 
to prepare derivative works is not independent of the other four 
exclusive rights, but is infringed only in conjunction with at least one 
of the other four exclusive rights. The right to prepare derivative 
works is infringed only when a modified version of a copyrighted 
work is reproduced, distributed to the public, or publicly performed or 
displayed; if the allegedly infringing activity is the private 
performance of a derivative work, without any fixation of that 
derivative work, the exclusive right to prepare derivative works is not 
violated. 
This interpretation gives meaning to the apparent intent of 
Congress that fixation is not required to infringe the right to prepare 
derivative works, while avoiding the absurd result that the right to 
prepare derivative works may be infringed merely by imagining an 
altered version of a work. In order for that altered version to infringe, 
more than mere imagination is required: either it must be fixed in 
some tangible medium (violating the reproduction right, and creating 
a "copy" which can then be publicly distributed or displayed), or it 
must be publicly performed. In the absence of one of these additional 
activities, no infringement has occurred. 14 7 
As indicated in the 1 961 Report, however, this has long been looked upon as a 
separate exclusive right, and to omit any specific mention of it would be likely to 
cause uncertainty and misunderstanding. 
1965 SUPPLEMENTAL REpORT, supra note 55, at 1 7. 
1 46. H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 5675. 
1 47 .  A similar interpretation is set forth in 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[A], at 8- 1 38 
("[I]f the right to make derivative works . . .  has been infringed, then there is necessarily also an 
infringement of either the reproduction or perfonnance rights."); id. at 8- 139 ("If a derivative 
work is not fixed in copies or phonorecords, it will not constitute an infringement of the 
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There are some possible objections to this interpretation. First, 
the statute says that the copyright owner "has the exclusive right to do 
and to authorize any of the following,,,148 which certainly suggests 
that the drafters intended the exclusive rights which follow to be 
independent of one another. This is seemingly confirmed by the 
House Report, which states: 
The first three clauses of section 1 06 . . .  extend to every kind of 
copyrighted work. The exclusive rights encompassed by these 
clauses, though closely related, are independent; they can generally 
be characterized as rights of copying, recording, adaptation, and 
publishing. A single act of infringement may violate all of these 
rights at once, as where a publisher reproduces, adapts, and sells 
copies of a person's  copyrighted work as part of a publishing 
venture. Infringement takes place when any one of the rights is 
violated: where, for example, a printer reproduces copies without 
selling them or a retailer sells copies without having anything to do . h h . d ·  149 Wit t elr repro uctlOn.
This passage states that each of the exclusive rights is "independent" 
of the others and may be violated by itself. But the example given is 
that the reproduction and distribution rights may be violated 
separately; there is no example given in which the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works is violated without also violating at least one 
of the other four rights. The references elsewhere in the legislative 
history to unfixed derivative works all involve public 
performances; 1 50 this, combined with Congressional intent not to 
prohibit private performances and displays generally, l S I  should be 
sufficient to trump a generalization drawn from a different context. 
As for the statutory language, while plain language interpretation is to 
be favored,152 it ought not to be used to contradict other portions of 
the statute l 53 (like those that prohibit only public performances or 
reproduction right in the pre-existing work, but it may nevertheless infringe the [public] 
performance right therein."). 
1 48. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (emphasis added). 
149. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61,  reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5674-75. 
1 50. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
1 5 1 .  See H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 63, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5677 ("Although 
any act by which the initial performance or display is transmitted, repeated, or made to recur 
would itself be a 'performance' or 'display' under the bill, it would not be actionable as an 
infringement unless it were done 'publicly,' as defined in section 1 0 1 ."). 
1 52. See generally 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.0 1 .  
1 53. See 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.05 at 170-7 1 ("[A] 'clear and unambiguous' 
statutory provision . . .  is one having a meaning that is not contradicted by other language in the 
same act."); Id. § 46.01 at 125-26 ("One who questions the application of the plain meaning rule 
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displays),1 54 or to lead to absurd results1 55 (like prohibiting merely 
imagining a derivative work).1 56 One way to reach the desired result 
would be to interpret the word "prepared" to mean "reproduced, 
distributed, publicly performed, or publicly displayed." This 
interpretation requires something more formal than mere imagination, 
but it avoids direct reference to the statutorily-defined terms "created" 
or "fixed." 
Another objection is that the right to prepare derivative works is 
redundant if it is interpreted to be violated only in conjunction with 
one of the other four rights, and it is a general canon of statutory 
construction that redundancy is to be avoided.1 5 7  One answer to this 
objection is that Congress specifically intended redundancy in this 
particular instance: as noted above, the Register of Copyrights stated 
that a separate right might be "unnecessary," but recommended its 
inclusion "to avoid any doubt.,,1 58 More fundamentally, in the 
absence of a derivative work right the other four rights could have 
been construed to be limited to versions which were closely similar 
to, or nearly identical with, the original fixed version of the work. A 
dependent right to prepare derivative works therefore serves the 
important purpose of ensuring that the scope of the other four rights 
to a provision of an act must show . . .  that some other section of the act expands or restricts its 
meaning. "). 
1 54. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 06(4) (2000) (exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly"); Id. § 106(5) (exclusive right "to display the copyrighted work publicly") (emphases 
added). 
1 55. See 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.01 at 128; In re Trans-Alaska Pipeline Rate 
Cases, 436 U.S. 63 1 ,  643 ( 1 978) ("This Court, in interpreting the words of a statute, has some 
scope for adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where 
acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd results.") (internal quotes omitted); Nixon v. 
Mo. Mun. League, No. 02- 1 238 (U.S. S.C!. Mar. 24, 2004), slip. op. at 12, 2004 WL 573799, at 
*8 ("[This) Court will not construe a statute in a manner that leads to absurd or futile results."). 
1 56. See supra notes 56--60 and accompanying text. 
1 57. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 , 3 1  (200 1 )  ("It is a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be 
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.") (internal 
quotations omitted); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 1 23 S.C!. 
204 1 ,  2048 (2003) ("A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superfluous is of 
course to be avoided."); 2A SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.06 at 1 8 1 .  
158. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 
8.09[A), at 8-1 38 to 8-1 38 . 1  ("The best indication of the superfluity of the adaptation right lies 
in the fact that those infrequent cases under the 1 909 Act that invoked the comparable right to 
"make any other version" generally also invoked an alternative ground of infringing copying.") 
(citing cases). 
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includes all versions which contain expression that is "substantially 
similar" to protected expression in the original work. 159 
Another objection would be to say that such questions can be 
adequately dealt with through the fair-use doctrine.1 60 It is true that 
the fair use doctrine can be expected to insulate many, perhaps even 
most, personal uses from infringement. 1 61 However, the fair use 
doctrine is already asked to carry a tremendous portion of the policy 
considerations present in U.S. copyright law.1 62 In addition, the fair 
use doctrine, like any multi-factor balancing test, is inherently 
unpredictable; the lack of clarity in its application leads to a "chilling 
effect" that may deter others from engaging in activities (such as 
mounting and framing works of art) that are socially desirable. 1 63 
1 59. 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 8.09[A], at 8- 138 ("[U]nless the [alleged derivative 
work] is substantially similar to its forbear, it remains nonactionable."). 
160. See 17  U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . .  is not an 
infringement of copyright."). The statute lists several examples of purposes that may qualify as 
fair uses, and four factors that courts should consider in determining whether a particular use is 
fair. 
16 1 .  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 447-55 ( 1 984) 
(holding that home videotaping of broadcast television for time-shifting purposes is a fair use); 
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969-72 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding in the alternative that use of the Game Genie for private home enjoyment was a fair 
use). But see United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 1 1 ,  1 1 35 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
("[T]here is as yet no generally recognized right to make a copy of a protected work, regardless 
of its format, for personal noncommercial use."). 
162. For example, the fair use doctrine has been invoked to determine the legality of home 
videotaping for time-shifting purposes, educational and corporate photocopying, news reporting, 
parody and satire, use of letters and film clips in biographies and documentaries, fan and 
collector's guides, digital sampling, decornpilation and reverse engineering, comparative 
advertising, and internet search engines. See generally 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 1 3 .05; 2 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT (2004 ed.), Chapter 1 0. 
163. Cf Rubenfeld, supra note 60, at 1 7  n.75 ("[T]he vagueness of the fair use doctrine 
must surely have the proverbial 'chilling effect' on some protected speech."); Kenneth D. 
Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 3 1  
ARIZ. ST. LJ. I ,  10-1 1 ( 1 999) ("The problem with fair use is that a single case-even a case 
from a lower court--can have chilling effects on matters of great public interest . . . .  [Many 
individuals] are too fearful of infringements and litigation to identify and assert a claim of fair 
use."); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist 's Privilege, 1 5  CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249, 269 
(1 997) ("It is difficult to predict in advance whether a particular use will be pronounced fair if 
challenged by the author of the copied work. This uncertainty of outcome of fair use litigation 
produces a 'chilling' effect that may on occasion stifle the use altogether. Merely the threat of 
litigation can have a serious chilling effect on defendants of modest means. A would-be user 
who is financially unable to fight a fair use battle will avoid subjecting herself to the possibility 
of defending such a lawsuit by avoiding the use altogether. This chilling effect, by inhibiting 
uses that would increase public access to works of authorship, directly undermines copyright's 
goal."). 
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V. THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION ApPLIED 
To demonstrate the advantages of the proposed alternative 
interpretation, consider how it would operate in each of the four 
hypothetical situations outlined in Part I of this article. 
A. Arranging a Musical Work 
Suppose a person sits down at a piano and creates a new 
arrangement of a popular song. This would not by itself be an 
infringement of the copyright, because the person has not yet fixed 
the new arrangement in a tangible medium. Later, the person 
performs the new arrangement for some friends in the privacy of his 
home. This would also not be an infringement of the copyright, 
because it is not a public performance of the new arrangement. This 
result makes sense; the person clearly would not be infringing if he or 
she performed the work privately without modification; 1 64 the fact 
there was a modification, by itself, should not be deemed to make the 
private performance infringing. It also makes sense from an 
evidentiary point of view: once the new arrangement is fixed in a 
tangible medium, the reproduction right is violated, and there is 
tangible evidence of the violation. Similarly, if a public performance 
takes place, evidence of the infringing performance will be easily 
obtained. We don't have to worry about copyright owners infiltrating 
a private party in someone's home or deposing the arranger's family 
and friends to obtain evidence of copyright infringement. 
B. Mounting and Framing a Copyrighted Work 
Suppose a person cuts a photograph out of a book, mounts it 
upon a ceramic tile, and displays the mounted photo in her home. We 
still have the question of whether the mounting process has "recast, 
transformed, or adapted" the photo, within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act. 1 65 Most commentators agree with the Seventh Circuit 
that it does not.1 6 6 But under the proposed interpretation, it doesn't 
1 64. See 1 7  V.S.c. § I 06(4) (exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly") 
(emphasis added); 17  V.S.C. § 101  (defining "publicly" as "at a place open to the public or at 
any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered," or by transmission). Just how many persons is a "substantial 
number" or a "normal circle" is open to interpretation. See Daniel Cantor, How Many Guests 
Must Attend a Wedding Reception Before ASCAP Shows Up? Or, What Are the Limits of the 
Definition of Perform "Publicly " Under 17 u.s.c. § 101?, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 79 (2003). 
165. See supra notes 1 04-14 and accompanying text. 
1 66. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER, supra note 48, § 3.03[8][ 1 ]  at 3- 1 6  to 3 - 17; 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 1 62, § 5.3 at 5:84 to 5:84- 1 .  
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matter: there has been no reproduction, because there has been no new 
fixation of the copyrighted work; 1 67 and there has been no public 
distribution or public display of the mounted work. This 
interpretation of the Copyright Act makes sense, because it prevents 
what the Seventh Circuit found "jarring": an interpretation of the Act 
that makes criminals (or at least infringers) out of art collectors and 
tourists. 1 68 
What if the person places a transparent piece of pink plastic over 
the photograph before displaying it? The work that is perceived by 
the viewer is now different; it has a pink tint to it. But even assuming 
that this modification was "original" enough to qualify as a derivative 
work, again it would not be infringing, because there has been no new 
fixation of the copyrighted work, and hence no reproduction;1 69 and 
because there has not been any public display or public distribution of 
the pink-tinted photo. The same would be true if the person painted 
the photo with pink watercolor instead of covering it with pink 
plastic, or if the person used several photos cut out of magazines or 
art books to make a collage. 
A more difficult question is posed when the person wants to 
publicly display or sell the modified photo. If the photo is not 
modified, it may be publicly displayed and resold under the first-sale 
doctrine, because it is a copy "lawfully made under this title.,, 1 70 How 
should we analyze the sale when the photo has been modified? There 
are three possibilities. 
1 67. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 06(1 )  (exclusive right "to reproduce the work in copies or 
phonorecords") (emphasis added); Id. § 1 0 1  (defining "copies" as "material objects . . .  in which 
a work is first fixed"); H . R. Rep. No. 94- 1476 (Right of reproduction is "the right to produce a 
material object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or simulated in a fixed 
form. "). In this case, the alleged infringer has not produced a material object; he or she has 
merely modified an existing material object. In addition, the alleged infringer has not 
duplicated, transcribed, imitated or simulated the copyrighted work, an intangible image which 
has been left unaltered. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 202 (distinguishing between the work and a tangible 
copy of the work). 
168. See Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 1 25 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1 997). 
1 69. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 1 54 F.3d 1 1 07, I 1 1 1  n.4 (9th Cir. 1 998) (the "Pink 
Screener"). 
1 70. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 09(a) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or 
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."); [d. § 1 09(c) ("[T]he owner 
of a particular copy lawfully made under this title . . .  is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . .  to viewers present at the place where the copy 
is located."). 
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First, we could impose the Ninth Circuit's "concrete or 
permanent" form requirement,1 7 I which would condemn the photo 
that is painted pink but would permit the photo which is simply 
displayed under pink plastic. This option seems to elevate form over 
substance, and it suffers from the problem of imposing a requirement 
("concrete or permanent form") that does not appear to be in the 
statute. 
Second, we could say that although the original work could be 
publicly displayed and resold, the modified work cannot be publicly 
displayed or resold without the permission of the copyright owner, 
because the first-sale doctrine does not apply to the right to prepare 
derivative works. l 72 This would avoid inconsistent treatment since 
both the pink-washed and the pink-framed photos would be treated 
the same, but it would prevent a person who creates home arts-and­
crafts out of lawfully purchased copies of copyrighted works from 
reselling them, which does not seem to be in the public interest of 
encouraging creativity. 
Third, under the proposed alternative interpretation, we could 
say that since the right to prepare derivative works is not infringed 
except in conjunction with one of the other four rights, and since the 
first-sale doctrine permits the buyer to publicly display and resell his 
or her own copy of the photo, this conduct is simply not actionable. 
This result makes the most sense, because it permits buyers of 
lawfully-made copies to reap the fruits of their own creativity in 
modifying the purchased copy; and it permits the copyright owner to 
reap the reward for his or her contribution to the finished product 
because he or she gets paid when the lawfully-authorized copy is sold 
in the first place.17 3 Another way to reach the same result would be 
for Congress to amend the first-sale doctrine to expressly include 
modifications to a lawfully-purchased copy that do not result in any 
reproduction of the copyrighted work. While such an amendment 
would solve the specific problem present in Mirage and Lee, it would 
not solve the larger problem of unfixed derivative works generally. 
The fair use doctrine would still be required to meet one 
variation on this hypothetical: the Internet resale. In order to sell the 
1 7 1 .  See Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at 1 1 1 0. 
1 72. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 09(a) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3)"); Id. § 
1 09(c) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5)"). 
1 73. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 58 1 ("Because the artist could capture the value of her art's 
contribution to the finished product as part of the price for the original transaction, the economic 
rationale for protecting an adaptation as 'derivative' is absent . . . .  An alteration that includes 
(or consumes) a complete copy of the original lacks economic significance."). 
HeinOnline -- 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1027 2003-2004
2004] COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIVE WORKS & FIXATION 1027 
work over the Internet, the craftsperson would have to display a 
photograph of it on the Internet. This would violate the public display 
right, because the first-sale doctrine only applies to displaying a 
particular copy to persons who are physically present at the place 
where the copy is located.174 It would also violate the reproduction 
right, because any electronic copy of the work (such as a digital 
photograph) would be a "reproduction.,,175 Consequently, the 
proposed alternative interpretation would not shield the craftsperson 
in this instance. But the fair use doctrine can strike the appropriate 
balance in such a situation. A high-resolution photograph of the 
modified work, permanently displayed on a website, would operate as 
a substitute for the copyrighted work itself, or for lawfully-authorized 
derivative works, so a finding of infringement would be 
appropriate. 17 6 But a thumbnail photograph of the modified work, 
temporarily displayed on an auction site, would not operate as a 
substitute, and should be permitted. 177 
C. Modifying a Video Game 
Suppose a company creates an electronic device that alters the 
display of a popular video game. A teenager plays the video game in 
his home while using the device. In this case there is no 
infringement, not because the altered screen display does not 
incorporate the original audiovisual work in some "concrete or 
permanent" form, 178 but because there has been no reproduction, 
public distribution, public performance or public display of the altered 
video game. No distribution has occurred, because there has been no 
"sale or other transfer of ownership" nor any "rental, lease or lending" 
of the game.179 Playing the game at home is a performance rather 
1 74. See 17 V.S.c. § 109(c). 
1 75. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991  F. Supp. 543, 551  (N.D. Tex. 
1 997); Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 13,  1 12 1  (D. Nev. 
1 998) ("The prevailing view therefore seems to be that the digitization or input of any 
copyrighted material, whether it be computer code or visual imagery, may support a finding of 
infringement . . . .  "). Although both of these cases rely on the controversial doctrine of "RAM 
copies," see supra note 65, displaying a photograph on the Internet would generally involve a 
more permanent means of electronic storage, such as a hard disk. 
1 76. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft, Inc., 280 F.3d 934, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002), opinion 
withdrawn and superseded, 336 F.3d 8 1 1  (9th Cir. 2003). Although the original opinion in 
Kelly was withdrawn, and can therefore no longer be cited as precedent, its reasoning on this 
point appears to be sound. 
1 77. Kelly, 336 F .3d at 82 1-22. 
1 78. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
1 79. See 1 7  V.S.C. § 106(3). 
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than a display,1 80 but it is not a "public" performance; 181 so the only 
remaining question is whether there has been a reproduction. While 
the computer program that operates the video game has been copied 
into RAM,182 and while that computer program has been modified by 
the device, this use would appear to fall within the exemption 
provided in section 117(a)(1) for RAM copies, which states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an 
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to 
make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that 
computer program provided: 
( 1 )  that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential 
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with 
a machine and that it is used in no other manner . . . .  1 3 
There are two legal questions concerning the interpretation of this 
section. First, what does "an essential step" mean? Any computer 
program must be copied into RAM for the computer to work.184 With 
regard to adaptations, must the adaptation itself be the essential step, 
i.e., the computer program won't work unless it is adapted?185 Or is it 
sufficient that the RAM copy is essential for the adapted computer 
program to work (which would permit adaptations like those 
permitted to be made in Galoob)? 186 This issue was raised in Galoob 
180. See id. § 10 1  (definition of "perfonnance"). 
1 8 1 .  Id. (definition o f  "publicly"). 
1 82. See supra note 65. 
183 .  1 7  U.S.C. § 1 1 7(a)(I). 
184. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 600 n. 1 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
1 85 .  This limitation is suggested by certain language in CONTU Report, which effectively 
constitutes the legislative history of Section 1 1 7. See FINAL REpORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 1 3  ( 1978) ("CONTU 
Report"), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTUIPDF/Chapter3.pdf ("Because of a 
lack of complete standardization among programming languages and hardware in the computer 
industry, one who rightfully acquires a copy of a program frequently cannot use it without 
adapting it to that limited extent which will allow its use in the possessor's computer. The 
copyright law . . .  should no more prevent such use than it should prevent rightful possessors 
from loading programs into their computers. Thus, a right to make those changes necessary to 
enable the use for which it was both sold and purchased should be provided. "). 
186. This more expansive reading also finds support in the CONTU Report. See id. at 1 3  
("The conversion o f  a program from one higher-level language to another to facilitate use would 
fall within this right, as would the right to add features to the program that were not present at 
the time of lawful acquisition.") (emphasis added). See Foresight Resources Corp. v. 
Pfortmiller, 7 1 9  F. Supp. 1006, 1009-1 0  (D. Kan. 1 989) (relying on this language); cf Vault 
Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 26 1 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Section 1 1 7 . . .  contains no 
language to suggest that the copy it pennits must be employed for a use intended by the 
copyright owner."). 
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at the preliminary injunction stage but was not resolved,1 8 7 as the case 
was decided on other grounds. Second, this statute implicates the 
issue of whether the purchaser of a computer program is an "owner" 
of a copy of that program, or merely a "licensee," as various end-user 
license agreements ("EULAs"), including shrink-wrap and click-on 
licenses, assert.1 88 This issue is one to which many scholarly articles 
have been devoted, 1 89 and is well beyond the scope of this article. 
Micro Star, on the other hand, presents a difficult case. The new 
"levels" were modified versions of the original audiovisual work (or, 
more precisely, were different combinations of the visual elements 
that constituted the original audiovisual work). 190 Again, there was no 
public performance or display of those new levels. The question is 
whether the CD-ROM containing the new MAP files was itself a 
"copy" of the modified audiovisual works, i.e., a material object in 
which the modified works were fixed, as is required for a violation of 
the reproduction and distribution rights. The CD-ROM containing the 
new MAP files is certainly a material object which can be copied and 
distributed to the public; and the MAP files are permanently "fixed" 
in the CD-ROM.191 The difficulty arises from the fact that the MAP 
files are not self-contained; they cannot generate a display without 
interacting with the game engine and the source art library. 192 
1 87. See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 
199 1 )(unpublished decision), available at 199 1  WL 5 1 7 1 ,  at **3 ("[W]e are persuaded that 
Nintendo raises a substantial question on the merits . . . .  Galoob's argument that 1 7  U.S.c. § 
1 1 7 provides a defense to that claim is not so strong as to dispel that substantial question."); see 
also Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1 032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(describing the issues raised at the preliminary injunction hearing). 
1 88. See, e.g. , DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 
1 360-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Softman Prods. Co. v.  Adobe Sys., Inc., 1 7 1  F. Supp. 2d 1 075, 1082-
88 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
1 89. In the context of Section 1 1 7, see Stephen Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer 
Software Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 197 ( 1992); 
Robert A. Kreiss, Comment, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 BYU L. REv. 1497. More 
generally, see Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don 't Judge a Sale by its License: 
Transfers Under the First-Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36 
U.S.F. L. REv. I (200 1); Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line 
Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5 1 1  ( 1 997); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 239 ( 1 995). 
1 90. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 1 54 F.3d 1 1 07, 1 1 10 (9th Cir. 1 998) (describing 
operation of MAP files). 
1 9 1 .  Id. at 1 1 1 2 ("[T]he audiovisual displays assume a concrete or permanent form in the 
MAP files. "). 
192. Id. at 1 1 10 ("When the player selects one of the [new] levels, the game engine 
references the [allegedly infringing] MAP files, but still uses the [original] art library to generate 
the images that make up that leveL"). 
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In essence, there are three works of authorship in this situation: 
the original game (which is fixed in a CD-ROM); the new MAP files 
(a computer program, which is a type of literary work, fixed in a 
different CD-ROM); and the modified game which results from the 
interaction of the two other works. Is the modified game "fixed in 
tangible medium of expression"? It is "sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise 
communicated" to others, and it exists "for a period of more than 
transitory duration.,,19 3  The user perceives the same modifications 
each and every time he or she uses the new MAP file with the original 
game. 194 If Micro Star was reproducing and distributing both CD­
ROMs, we would unquestionably find that it was distributing 
"copies" of the modified game; the fact that the copies consisted of 
two CDs instead of one would be no more significant than publishing 
a book in two volumes. But because Micro Star was reproducing and 
distributing only the CD-ROM containing the new MAP files, we 
must determine whether that single CD-ROM by itself constitutes a 
"copy" of the modified game. We might consider the answer to this 
question to be a matter of degree: the new MAP files described the 
audiovisual display "down to the last detail.,,195 Judge Kozinski 
analogized the new MAP files to a paint-by-numbers kit; each MAP 
file described a game level in such detail that its final appearance was 
essentially fixed, even though the actual paint was not inc1uded.19 6 
The new MAP files in Micro Star can be analogized to taking an existing novel and 
using the words in it to fonn a new novel. While the second novel was unquestionably 
"derived" from the first, it probably would not be considered infringing, because the individual 
words in a novel cannot be protected by copyright; only the original selection and arrangement 
of those words are protected, and the second novel has departed markedly from the original 
selection and arrangement. With an audiovisual work, however, it is more likely that the 
individual component images are protected by copyright, see Xoom, Inc. v. Imageline, Inc., 323 
F.3d 279, 284 (4th Cir. 2003) (individual "clip art" images are protected by registration of 
compilation of such images); so any recombination of those images might still be considered 
infringing, at least as long as the resulting combination was "substantially similar" to the 
original combination. 
193. 17  U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "fixed"). 
194. Micro Star, 154 F.3d at I I I I  ("[T]he audiovisual display that appears on the 
computer monitor when a [new] level is played is described-in exact detail-by [an allegedly 
infringing] MAP file."). 
1 95 .  ld. 
1 96. ld. at I I I  O. The practical effect is the same as recording an edited movie onto a 
videotape and distributing it to the public: the public cannot view the videotape without "the aid 
of a machine or device" (a television and a VCR), but the altered work is considered "fixed" on 
the videotape, even though the television supplies the red, green and blue pixels of which the 
picture is composed. In this case, the "machine or device" is not only the computer on which 
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Alternatively, we might consider that the statutory definition of 
fixation was "intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable 
distinctions .. . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases 
has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work 
is fixed.,,19 7 In other words, Congress wanted to make copyright 
technology-neutral. Finally, consider the statement that "a 
copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in 
any substantial part.,,1 98 Under this standard, reproducing only part of 
a derivative work is infringing, even if it is only the portion that is 
original to the derivative work author. All three of these 
considerations point to the same conclusion: the CD-ROM containing 
the new MAP file is a (partial) fixation of the modified audiovisual 
work, and is prima facie infringing. 
From an economic point of view, one can argue that the outcome 
in both Galoob and Micro Star should be the same. In both cases, the 
end result is a private performance of a modified version of the 
original work; and in both cases, the add-on (the Game Genie in 
Galoob, the MAP files in Micro Star) must be used with the original 
work in order to function. 199 By providing the ability to modify the 
original work, the add-on enhances the attractiveness of the original 
work and thereby makes it more valuable to consumers.200 But the 
add-on simultaneously makes authorized derivative works less 
attractive by competing with them.201 If ! can play a modified version 
of Donkey Kong on my Game Genie, or a modified version of Duke 
the game is played (which supplies the colored pixels), but a computer loaded with an art library 
of pre-existing combinations of pixels. 
1 97. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52, reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5665. 
198. Id. at 6 1 ,  reprinted in 1 976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675. 
199. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 1 082 ( 1 997) (advocating fair use protection for "independent works that 
merely interoperate with a copyrighted work"). Nimmer appears to take this position, albeit 
indirectly, by analyzing a counterfactual situation instead of the actual facts. See 2 NIMMER, 
supra note 48, § 8.09[A], at 8- 142 n. 1 2.2 1 ("To the extent that [Micro Star] . . .  incorporated 
into its own product coding sufficient to run Nuke-It even without the purchase of Duke Nukem, 
the result of this case contrary to that reached in Galoob is amply warranted."). 
200. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1 295-96 
(N.D. Cal. 1991 )  ("The only empirical evidence of market reaction to the Game Genie . . .  
indicates that the Game Genie will enhance, not detract from, Nintendo's sales."), ajJ'd, 964 
F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1 992). 
20 1 .  See Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at 1 1 1 3 ("[S]y selling [Nuke-It], Micro Star impinged on 
ForrnGen's ability to market new versions of the [Duke Nukem] story.") (internal quotes 
omitted). 
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Nukem with my new MAP files, I am probably less likely to buy 
Donkey Kong II or Duke Nukem 11.202 
In Galoob, however, one cannot say that the Game Genie was a 
"copy" of the modified audiovisual work, because none of the 
copyrightable expression of the modified work is fixed in the Game 
Genie.20 3 The Game Genie was simply a tool that enabled the user to 
make modifications when playing the game; and all such 
modifications were merely private performances of an unfixed 
derivative work?04 In Micro Star, an equivalent device would be an 
unauthorized "build editor" which permitted a user to make new game 
levels?05 So long as the user used the build editor only to temporarily 
modify his or her own game, no infringement would occur, as in 
Galoob. But as soon as the user fixed a new level by saving its MAP 
file, the fixed MAP file would constitute a "copy" (and hence a 
"reproduction") of the modified audiovisual work,20 6 and any sale of 
the new MAP files would constitute a public distribution of the 
modified audiovisual work.20 7 
202. On the other hand, in Ga/oob the District Court made a factual finding that few 
people would want to buy an authorized derivative that had such minor modifications, see 780 
F. Supp. at 1 295 ("There is neither evidence nor reason to believe that a consumer who owns the 
original game would invest a similar amount in a slight variation thereof."). In Micro Star, the 
copyright owner expressly allowed new MAP files to be distributed for free, see 1 54 F.3d at 
1 1 09, which would probably diminish the desire of some consumers to buy an authorized 
derivative work, although it would not diminish their ability to do so in tenns of disposable 
income, as would competing commercial sales. 
203. 780 F. Supp. at 1291  ("[A] consumer utilizing the Game Genie for noncommercial, 
private enjoyment . . .  neither generates a fixed transferable copy of the work, nor exhibits or 
perfonns the work [publicly] for commercial gain."). 
204. Id. ("The Game Genie is a tool by which the consumer may temporarily modify the 
way in which to play a video game, legally obtained at market price. Any modification is for 
the consumer's own enjoyment in the privacy of the home."). 
205. See 154 F.3d at 1 1 09 (describing authorized "Build Editor" utility). 
206. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
207. Public distribution of an unauthorized "build editor" might be challenged on the 
ground that it contributes to the infringement of the reproduction and derivative work rights by 
individuals; but because the "build editor" principally enables private perfonnances, which are 
likely to be fair uses, it is likely that a "build editor" would pass muster under the Supreme 
Court's "capable of substantial non-infringing uses" standard. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 17, 442 (1984). If, however, the video game console is 
subject to a "technological protection measure that effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] 
work" (such as the computer program that controls the console), then an unauthorized "build 
editor" might violate the anti-trafficking provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
See 17  U.S.C. § 1 201 (a)(2) (2000); see a/so Sony Computer EntIn't Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 
Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining distribution of a Game 
Enhancer for Sony PlayStation games). 
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D. Home Viewing of a Motion Picture 
Suppose that a person watching a videotape or DVD at home 
fast-forwards through certain parts of a movie, or presses the mute 
button during playback. Such a viewer perceives a different 
audiovisual experience than the viewer who views the movie all the 
way through without pushing any buttons. Is this the preparation of 
an infringing derivative work? If fixation is not required, it is; but 
under the proposed interpretation it is not, because there has not been 
any reproduction of the movie, nor has there been a public 
distribution, public performance or public display. Again, this 
construction makes sense, because it avoids making an infringer out 
of everyone who uses their remote control while viewing a motion 
picture at home.208 
Suppose instead that the same person uses the remote control to 
give a live performance of the work in the same manner, but does so 
in a public exhibition. Under the Ninth Circuit's requirement that the 
modified work incorporate the original work in some "concrete or 
permanent form,,,209 this could not be an infringement, because there 
is no permanence; the live performance of the modified work is 
evanescent and disappears as soon as it is finished. Yet there is no 
question that such a public performance should be an infringement of 
the copyright,2 1 O just as it would be if the person publicly performed a 
musical stage play based on a copyrighted motion picture.211 
Now consider the facts in Huntsman v. Soderbergh, an action 
currently pending in federal court in Colorado.212 Huntsman is a local 
distributor of movies edited by Clean Flicks, a Utah company that 
reproduces and distributes edited versions of copyrighted Hollywood 
208. See Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291  (Neither fast-forward nor slow-motion 
"permanently modifies or alters the original work, [nor 1 produces a separate work which can 
then be transferred in any way."). 
209. Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at 1 1 1 0. 
2 1 0. Cj Galoob, 780 F. Supp. at 129 1  (distinguishing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int 'l, Inc. , 
704 F.2d 1 009 (7th Cir. 1 983), on the ground that in Midway, defendant "was making money 
from the public performance of the altered game"). 
2 1 1 . See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op Prods., Inc., 479 F. 
Supp. 35 1 ,  355-56 (N.D. Ga. 1 979) (musical play "Scarlett Fever" was a prima facie violation 
of the right to prepare derivative works based on "Gone With The Wind"). This, of course, does 
not answer the further question whether there is a fair use defense for such a performance. 
Compare id. at 357-61 ("Scarlett Fever" was neither a parody nor a satire, and was not a fair 
use) with SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1 268-76 ( 1 1 th Cir. 200 1 )  
(novel "The Wind Done Gone" was a parody and critique of "Gone With the Wind" and was a 
fair use). 
2 1 2. Civil Action No. 02-M-1662 (D. Colo. filed Aug. 29, 2002). 
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movies to the pUblic.2 1 3  The gimmick is that there is a one-to-one 
exchange: Clean Flicks alleges that it only rents or sells as many 
copies of the altered movie as the number of copies it has lawfully 
purchased.214 
Huntsman originally filed suit against 16 prominent film 
directors for a declaratory judgment that his business did not infringe 
any copyrights or trademarks.21 5 The Directors Guild of America was 
permitted to intervene as a defendant, and it filed a counterclaim 
against Huntsman, Clean Flicks, and several other companies 
engaging in similar operations,21 6 alleging a violation of the Lanham 
Act for distributing edited versions of movies with their directors' 
names on them, allegedly a false attribution of origin.2 1 7 The 
directors, of course, do not own the copyrights in their films; the 
2 1 3. See http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). 
2 14. See Second Amended Complaint at 4, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, Civil Action No. 02-
M-1662 (D. Colo. filed Oct. 28, 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/copyrightlcflixstud 102802cmp.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 
2004). Clean Flicks alleges that it either: ( I )  distributes an authorized copy together with the 
edited copy; (2) preserves the authorized copy but renders it inoperable and replaces it with an 
edited copy; or (3) makes a single edited copy available to a consortium of members who have 
purchased an authorized copy. Id. 
2 1 5. The sixteen directors are: Stephen Soderbergh, Robert Altman, Michael Apted, 
Taylor Hackford, Curtis Hanson, Norman Jewison, John Landis, Michael Mann, Philip Noyce, 
Brad Silberling, Betty Thomas, Irwin Winkler, Martin Scorsese, Stephen Spielberg, Robert 
Redford, and Sydney Pollack. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 2 14, at 1-2. 
2 1 6. In addition to the original plaintiffs (Huntsman and Clean Flicks of Colorado, 
L.L.C.), the counterclaim defendants include Clean Flicks; MyCleanFlicks; Trilogy Studios, 
Inc., Family Shield Technologies, Inc.; ClearPlay, Inc.; Clean Cut Cinemas; Family Safe Media; 
EditMyMovies; Family Flix USA, L.L.C.; and Play It Clean Video, Inc. Second Amended 
Complaint, supra note 2 1 4, at I .  As will be explained below, Trilogy, Family Shield and Clear 
Play operate in a manner that is different from Clean Flicks and the other defendants. See infra 
notes 224, 233-35 and accompanying text. 
2 1 7. See 1 5  U.S.C. § 1 125(a)( l)(A) (2000). The Lanham Act claim is based on Gilliam v. 
Am. Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1 976), in which the Second Circuit held that the 
writers and directors of the British comedy series "Monty Python's Flying Circus" had a 
Lanham Act claim against ABC for broadcasting heavily-edited versions of the shows on 
American television. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-25.  The continued viability of this cause of 
action is questionable, however, in light of the subsequent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 539 U.S. 23 (2003), which held that a 
failure to attribute authorship of a copyrighted work was not a "false designation of origin" 
under the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court did preserve the possibility of a cause of action for 
false advertising for materially misleading the public, but such a claim would be limited to 
requiring correct information in "commercial advertising or promotion," rather than a 
prohibition on selling the edited version. See 1 5  U.S.C. § I I 25(a)(1)(B); Jane C. Ginsburg, The 
Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law, 41  Hous. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2004). 
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studios do.2 1 8  Huntsman therefore filed an amended complaint adding 
claims for declaratory relief against the major motion picture 
studios,219 and the studios filed counterclaims alleging copyright 
infringement against Clean Flicks and the other counterdefendants.22o 
Clean Flicks' business model clearly violates the copyright laws. 
Clean Flicks is reproducing and distributing derivative works: 
modified versions of copyrighted motion pictures. The fact that 
Clean Flicks alleges a one-to-one exchange does not exonerate it; the 
copyright owner has the exclusive right to make new fixations of the 
copyrighted work22 I (or any modified versions of the work),222 and 
Clean Flicks is making new fixations without authorization. One 
cannot publish thousands of copies of a bowdlerized version of a 
novel just because one has purchased the same number of copies of 
the original from an authorized distributor. If that were the case, the 
copyright owner could never enforce his or her copyright at the 
reproduction stage; he or she would have to wait until the allegedly 
infringing copies were actually distributed in order to ensure that no 
one-to-one exchange had occurred.22 3 
2 1 8. See 17  U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2000) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or 
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this 
title. "); /d. § 1 0 1  (defining "work made for hire" to include "a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use . . . as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, . . .  if the 
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered 
a work made for hire"); F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of 
Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REv. 225, 3 1 7-18  (200 1). 
2 19. The eight studios named in the Second Amended Complaint are: Metro Goldwyn 
Mayer Studios, Inc.; Time Warner Entertainment Co. (Warner Bros.); Sony Pictures 
Entertainment; Walt Disney Enters., Inc.; Dreamwerks L.L.C.; Universal City Studios, Inc.; 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp; and Paramount Pictures Corp. Second Amended Complaint, 
supra note 2 1 4, at 2. 
220. Motion Picture Studio Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, Huntsman v. 
Soderbergh, Civil Action No. 02-M-1 662 (D. Colo. filed Dec. 1 3, 2002), available at 
http://news.findlaw.coml hdocs/docs/copyrightlcflixstudI 2 1 302acc.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 
2004). 
22 1 .  See 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 06( 1) (exclusive right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords"); Id. § 1 0 1  (defining "copies" and "phonorecords" as material objects in which 
the work is fixed). 
222. See id. § I 06(2) (exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based on the 
copyrighted work"). Under the proposed alternative interpretation, the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works is violated in conjunction with the exclusive rights of reproduction and 
distribution. See notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
223. By contrast, as a result of the first-sale doctrine, it may not be an infringement to 
physically alter a purchased copy of a copyrighted work and to sell the altered copy. See supra 
notes 165-73 and accompanying text. The principal reason for this distinction is that, unlike the 
purported one-to-one exchange, the first-sale doctrine ensures that the copyright owner has in 
fact sold (or given away) an authorized copy of the work. In addition, the first-sale doctrine is 
inherently self-limiting: an artist who has to modify individual copies of a copyrighted work is 
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But not all of the defendants are infringing in the blatant manner 
of Clean Flicks. For example, a company called Clear Play does not 
reproduce the copyrighted work in any form. Instead, it sells software 
that, when used in conjunction with an authorized copy of the motion 
picture, automatically instructs the DVD player to skip over certain 
parts of the movie or to mute the volume at certain moments during 
playback?24 What the viewer sees is an edited version of the motion 
picture. If fixation is not required in any manner, the use of this 
software would be a violation of the right to prepare derivative works; 
but such a construction would also make an infringer out of the 
person who simply uses the fast-forward button and the mute button 
to accomplish the same thing. 
If we use the proposed alternative interpretation, there has been 
no public performance or public display of the modified audiovisual 
work, so a viewer who uses the Clear Play software is not liable for 
copyright infringement. Whether Clear Play itself is directly liable 
depends on whether the CD-ROM containing the software mask is a 
"copy" of the modified audiovisual work, as is required for both the 
reproduction right and the public distribution right. Because the Clear 
Play CD-ROM contains only instructions for modifying a copyrighted 
work (in the form of time codes and software instructions) but does 
not itself contain any sounds or images, it can be argued that it is not a 
"copy" in which the altered audiovisual work is fixed.225 This 
superficially attractive pOSition, however, misunderstands the 
distinction between the intangible work and a tangible copy of the 
work. 
unlikely to sell enough copies to substantially interfere with the copyright owner's ability to 
market competing derivative works. 
Drawing a distinction between the first-sale doctrine and a one-to-one exchange 
avoids injecting into every copyright case a question of fact concerning the alleged infringer' s  
subjective intention. An alleged infringer caught with multiple copies of an edited work could 
always claim that he or she intended only to exchange them for authorized copies. 
224. ClearPlay's technology currently works only with DVDs played on personal 
computers, but there are plans to develop a version to be incorporated into stand-alone DVD 
players. See The Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Huntsman v. Soderbergh, Civil Action No. 02-M-1 662 (D. Colo. filed 
June 6, 2003) at 1 0-1 1 ,  available at http://www.eff.orgiCases/Huntsman_v_Soderbergh/ 
200306 17  _support_sumj.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). By contrast, Counter-Defendant 
Family Shield provides a combination software and hardware device that connects to and 
automatically controls a standard VCR or DVD player. Id. at 6-7. 
225. See H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 62, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5675 ("[T]o 
constitute a violation of section 106(2), the infringing work must incorporate a portion of the 
copyrighted work in some form."). 
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As in Micro Star, there are three works involved here: the 
original movie (which is fixed on a DVD); the time codes and 
software instructions for that movie (which are fixed on the CD­
ROM); and the edited version of the movie which is perceived by the 
viewer when he or she plays the original movie with the software 
mask.22 6 As in Micro Star, the edited movie (an intangible derivative 
work) is fixed in a combination of two tangible objects: the DVD 
distributed by the studio, and the CD-ROM distributed by Clear 
Play.22 7 As in Micro Star, therefore, the proper conclusion is that the 
CD-ROM distributed by Clear Play is a partial fixation of the 
intangible derivative work, and that reproducing or distributing such a 
CD-ROM is a prima facie violation of the right to prepare derivative 
works?28 
Is there a meaningful distinction between Micro Star and Clear 
Play? The only difference is that in Micro Star, the software 
instructions resulted in a new arrangement of the component images 
comprising the underlying work, whereas in Clear Play the software 
instructions result only in a new selection of images and sounds. One 
might consider a detailed description of an audiovisual work to be a 
"fixation" of that work, even if the source art library was not 
included; whereas a description of portions of a work to be skipped 
might merely be considered to be a different way to experience an 
existing audiovisual work. The statute, however, makes it clear that 
mere edits to an original work can be a sufficient modification to 
qualify as a derivative work. It states that "[a] work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications 
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 
'derivative work. ",229 While this sentence alone might be construed 
to require substitutions or additions, instead of cuts, the Act also 
specifically states that an "abridgement [or] condensation" may be a 
derivative work.2 30 
With respect to fixation, the situation in Clear Play is much 
closer to Micro Star than to Galoob. In Galoob, the altered 
audiovisual performance was not fixed; it existed only as long as the 
226. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 1 93-98 and accompanying text. 
228. To clarify, I believe this result is the one that is most consistent with the statute as 
currently written; I do not necessarily believe that it is wise copyright policy. 
229. 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 0 1  (2000) (definition of "derivative work"). 
230. ld.; cf Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 1. 
COPYRIGHT. SOC'y U.S. 209, 2 1 7  n.29 ( 1 983) ("Although the infringer has added no expression 
of his own, he has contributed the arguably expressive effort of editing."). 
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altered game was being played.2 3 \  In Micro Star, the MAP file 
describing the altered audiovisual work was fixed in a CD-ROM.2 32 
In the case of Clear Play, the edited audiovisual work is fixed in part 
in the original DVD and in part in the CD-ROM. If one plays the 
same movie with the same software mask, one will always see and 
hear the same altered performance. 
This state of affairs is temporary, however, as Clear Play seeks 
to develop software that would allow users to customize the software 
mask to their individual taste. Indeed, two of Clear Play's 
competitors have already achieved differing degrees of customization. 
Counter-Defendant Family Shield provides "Movie Shield" hardware 
and software which groups edits into eight categories and allows the 
user to choose which categories are to be masked during any 
particular viewing;2 3 3  while Counter-Defendant Trilogy Systems, Inc., 
provides "Movie Mask" software which allows users to designate 
specific frames, scenes or sounds which they wish to skip or mute 
during playback.2 34 A fully customizable system like Movie Mask 
would appear to be indistinguishable from the Game Genie in Galoob 
and should be held not to violate the right to prepare derivative 
works.2 35 
It can be argued that the software masks distributed by Clear 
Play do nothing more than to automate a process that could be 
accomplished by an individual user using the fast-forward and mute 
buttons on his or her remote.2 3 6 This argument fails because 
automating specific edits results in a fixation of those edits. Under 
the proposed interpretation, it is not the private performance of the 
23 1 .  See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. 
233. See Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief, supra note 224, at 7. The eight 
categories are Disturbing Visuals, Immodesty, Minor Language, Major Language, Nudity, 
Religious References, Sexual Situations, and Violence. 
234. Id. at 12.  Trilogy also offers a variety of pre-programmed editing options with its 
Movie Mask Software. Id. 
235. This result is consistent with the copyright misuse doctrine, which seeks to prevent 
copyright holders from using their copyrights to gain commercial control over technology that is 
not itself subject to copyright protection. See, e.g., Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 
166 F.3d 772, 792-95 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the owner of copyright in software for 
telephone switching systems improperly attempted to gain commercial control over hardware 
market by requiring that software only be used with microprocessor cards manufactured by 
copyright owner). 
236. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1291 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (using a Game Genie "is analogous in purpose, if not in technology, to 
skipping portions of a book, learning to speed read, [or] fast-forwarding a video"), ajJ'd, 964 
F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1 992). 
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edited movie that infringes the right to prepare derivative works, but 
only the reproduction and distribution of the software mask, which 
contains a fixed set of edits. 
A series of examples will help illustrate the difference. If one 
published a book that described the contents of a DVD at certain time 
codes or frame numbers, that would most likely be considered purely 
factual infonnation that would enable viewers to exercise their 
individual discretion during playback. If one published a book that 
recommended or encouraged using the fast-forward and mute buttons 
at certain times or during certain frames, the instructions for 
modifying the work could be described as "fixed," but it is unlikely 
that a court would consider the modified audiovisual work itself to be 
fixed in book fonn, since no new fixation of sounds or images has 
occurred.2 3 7 Clear Play merely goes one step beyond such a book by 
automating the fast-forward-and-mute process. But as soon as that 
line is crossed, we have moved from a situation in which the 
individual user is exercising his or her discretion as to how to 
temporarily modify a work in the privacy of his or her own home (a 
private perfonnance of an unfixed derivative work) to a situation in 
which the only discretion the individual user has is whether to use a 
particular software mask (a fixed set of edits) or not. It is precisely at 
this point that we can expect a substantial number of users would pay 
for the convenience of having someone else make edits for them, and 
therefore it is at this point that a separate market for an edited version 
of the work can be said to exist. 2 3 8  
It is also relatively easy to draw a bright line between tools that 
enable users to prepare their own derivative works, such as the Game 
Genie, the Build Editor and the Movie Mask software, and the output 
of those tools, such as the MAP files in Micro Star and the individual 
software masks published by Clear Play. If a tool results only in an 
unfixed private perfonnance of a derivative work (like the Game 
Genie), there is no infringement by the user, and therefore there can 
be no liability for contributory infringement.2 39 Even if the tool 
237. See Ga/oob, 780 F. Supp. at 1291 ("Both parties agree that it is acceptable, under the 
copyright laws, for a noncopyright holder to publish a book of instructions on how to modify the 
rules and/or method of play of a copyrighted game."). 
238. See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 162, § 5.3.1  at 5:84- 1 ("[T]he reproduction right leaves 
off and derivative rights begin at that point at which the contribution of independent expression 
to an existing work effectively creates a new work for a different market."). 
239. See Ga/oob, 964 F.2d at 970 ("Contributory infringement is a form of third-party 
liability . . . .  [A] party cannot [be held liable for] authoriz[ing] another party to infringe a 
copyright unless the authorized conduct would itself be unlawful."). 
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pennits the user to fix a derivative work, most tools are "capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses,,,240 because they can be used to 
modify public domain works, the user's own works, or the 
copyrighted works of others who do not object to private use.241 (In 
addition, the private use of such tools might qualify as a fair use.242) 
Only fixed works that are individually tailored to modify specific 
copyrighted works, such as the MAP files or the software masks, will 
constitute a prima facie infringement of the right to prepare derivative 
works.24 3 
This conclusion does not necessarily mean that Clear Play and 
the other counter-defendants should ultimately be held liable. Under 
the fair use doctrine, the court may consider the effect of the use on 
the potential market for both the original work and derivative versions 
of the original,z44 The net effect on the market of the new game levels 
in Micro Star, on the one hand, and the fixed edits in Clear Play, on 
the other, are very different. In Micro Star we can expect that most 
purchasers who bought the original game would be willing to 
purchase new game levels as well, so that the distribution of new 
MAP files is likely to have a negative effect on the market for 
authorized derivative works.245 In the case of Clear Play, there is a 
market for the "clean" version of a motion picture,24 6 but there is little 
overlap between that market and the market for the original, because 
it is unlikely that most viewers will purchase two copies of the 
240. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 ( 1 984). 
241 .  ld. at 443 ("Even if it were deemed that home-use recording of copyrighted material 
constituted infringement, the Betamax [videotape recorder] could still legally be used to record 
non copyrighted material or material whose owners consented to the copying."). 
242. ld. at 447-55 (holding that home use of a videotape recorder for private, 
noncommercial time-shifting is a fair use); see also Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening 
Brief, supra note 224, at 25 (,,[The Studios] have conceded that, at a minimum, the consumers' 
use of the Player Control Parties' technologies to view DVDs in their own homes is a probable 
fair use of the Studios' works."). 
243. See Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 1 54 F.3d 1 107, 1 1 12 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding 
that new MAP files would not be infringing if they could be used with other video games). 
244. See 1 7  U.S.C. § 1 07(4) (2000); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 1 0  U.S. 569, 
590 (1 994). 
245. See Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at 1 1 i3  ("[B]y selling [Nuke-It], Micro Star impinged on 
FormGen's ability to market new versions of the [Duke Nukem] story.") (internal quotes 
omitted). In Galoob, by contrast, the court expressly made a finding that the changes were so 
minor that the Game Genie was unlikely to interfere with the market for new versions of 
Nintendo games. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1283, 1295 
(N.D. Cal. 1991), ajf'd, 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1 992). 
246. The very existence of a large number of companies providing edited versions of 
motion pictures and software masks demonstrates that there is a potential market for such 
products. 
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movie.247 Most viewers will purchase either the original version or 
the "clean" version only, so as long as the software mask technology 
requires the consumer who desires the latter to purchase the former, 
there is little net loss to the copyright owner.248 True, some parents 
might want to buy both versions,249 so they could watch the original 
version and they could let their kids watch the "clean" version; but it 
is unlikely that they would be willing to pay double the full price to 
get both versions. A copyright owner might be able to sell a 
"bundled" package that includes both versions, but one would expect 
that the price of a bundled version would be only a little more than the 
price of a single version.250 Consequently, the economic harm to the 
copyright owner of permitting others to make and sell software masks 
may be relatively small;251 whereas the public benefit of allowing 
competition in software masks is that the public will get to choose 
between many different edited versions of the same motion picture. 
Some will object to the contention that making and selling 
software masks is a fair use on the ground that the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works helps protect the "moral right" of the 
director (or other contributors )252 to have the work viewed in the form 
247. Cj Goldstein, supra note 230, at 2 1 7  n.24 ("[A]lthough the market for abridgments 
and condensations substantially overlaps the market for complete novels [or movies], the 
overlap is by no means perfect. "). 
248. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of 
New Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BuS. L. 57, 86-87 (2000). Loren advocates a test 
that expressly considers "whether the copyright owner in the underlying work is being 
compensated for the use of material . . .  that is being referenced by the integrated work." [d. at 
86. While this approach makes good policy sense, the Copyright Act as presently written 
appears to take such market considerations into account only in the context of the fair use 
doctrine. 
249. A counterexample is the ability of the studios to sell both the theatrical-release 
version of a motion picture and "special edition," a different version of the same movie with 
additional footage. However, it seems likely that the demand for new footage is more like the 
demand for a sequel, whereas the demand for edited versions is more in the nature of a 
substitute. Ultimately, this is an empirical question which can be addressed by consumer 
surveys at a trial on the issue of fair use. See Campbell, 569 U.S. at 593-94 (remanding for 
evidence of the effect of an alleged parody on the potential market for non-parody derivatives). 
250. This is analogous to one of the "additional features" included on the DVD version of 
a motion picture, which generally are included for only a little more than the ordinary purchase 
price of a DVD. 
25 1 .  Indeed, if the studios are unwilling to produce or license edited versions or software 
masks at all, then the economic harm to the copyright owner of permitting others to make and 
sell software masks may be zero. See Campbell, 5 1 0  U.S. at 592 ("The market for potential 
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or 
license others to develop. "). 
252. Exactly who should be considered the "author" of a motion picture, a highly 
collaborative art form, is a matter of some difficulty. See Craig A. Wagner, Motion Picture 
Colorization. Authenticity. and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 628, 7 14-15 ( \989). 
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III which it was released.25 3 There are several responses to this 
concern. First, Congress has considered and has expressly rejected 
any recognition of moral rights in motion pictures.z54 If we as a 
society wish to recognize moral rights, we should do so expressly, in 
a statute enacted by Congress, rather than indirectly through 
overbroad statutory interpretation.255 
Second, it is the major motion picture studios themselves that 
benefit most greatly from the absence of moral rights for motion 
pictures. Under standard industry arrangements, the director or other 
participants do not have final say over how a motion picture will be 
edited after its initial release.256 The studios own the copyrights; and 
studios traditionally have few qualms about cutting a motion picture 
For an extensive analysis, see Dougherty, supra note 2 1 8, at 267-3 1 6  (analyzing claims of 
producers, directors, screenwriters, cinematographers, editors, performers, production designers 
and composers); see also Stuart K. Kauffman, Motion Pictures. Moral Rights, and the Incentive 
Theory 0/ Copyright: The Independent Film Producer as "Author, " 1 7  CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 749 ( 1 999) (contending that the producer of an independent film should be considered an 
"author"). 
253. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14  (2d Cir. 1976), discussed at 
note 2 1 7, supra. In other countries, the moral right of integrity is separate from the economic 
right to prepare derivative works. See, e.g., Turner Entertainment Co. v. Huston, CA Versailles, 
No. 68, Roll No. 6 1 5192, Dec. 19, 1 994 (awarding damages to John Huston's  heirs for the 
broadcast in France of a colorized version of the motion picture THE ASPHALT JUNGLE (MGM 
1 950)). An English translation is available at 1 6  ENT. L. REp. No. 1 0, Mar. 1 995, at 3. 
254. See 17 U.S.c. § 106A (2000) (providing limited rights of attribution and integrity in 
"works of visual art"); 17 U.S.C. § 1 0 1  (excluding any "motion picture or other audiovisual 
work" and "any work made for hire" from the definition of a "work of visual art"). For an 
account of previous failed attempts to enact federal moral rights legislation for motion pictures, 
see Wagner, supra note 252, at 706-1 1 .  
255.  For a proposal, see Wagner, supra note 252, at 7 1 2-24; see generally Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 
VAND. L. REv. I ( 1 985). Recent efforts have focused on the more limited goal of enacting a 
federal right of attribution. See Ginsburg, supra note 2 1 7; Roberta Rosenthal K wall, The 
Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 
43(a), 77 Wash. L. Rev. 985 (2002). 
256. See Kauffman, supra note 252, at 75 1-52. The current collective bargaining 
agreement between the studios and the directors permits the Employer (the production 
company) to designate "[t]he individual having final cutting authority over the motion picture." 
Directors' Guild of America, Inc., Basic Agreement of 2002, Article 7-206 [hereinafter DGA 
Basic Agreement], available at http://www.dga.orgicontractsIBA-pdfsIBA-2002-article-7.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2004). However, the Agreement does require that the Employer offer the 
director "the first opportunity to make such cuts as are required" for network television 
showings. DGA Basic Agreement, Article 7-509(b). In practice, only a few directors have the 
economic clout to get their films shown on television without cuts. Steven Spielberg, for 
example, was able to insist that both SCHINDLER'S LIST ( 1 993) and SAVING PRIVATE RYAN 
( 1 998) be shown on TV without cuts. See Marvin J. Levy, Letter to the Editor: No Scenes Were 
Cut From "Schindler 's List, " WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1 997, at A I 9  (available at 1997 WL-WSJ 
2430208); Richard Huff, No Cuts/or "Ryan " on ABC, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 9, 200 1 ,  at 1 4 1  
(available at 2001 WL 27987060). 
HeinOnline -- 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1043 2003-2004
2004] COPYRIGHT, DERIVATIVE WORKS & FIXATION 1043 
for content-based reasons (to obtain a more favorable MPAA rating, 
or to edit out material for airline showings or for broadcast television) 
or for economic ones (to fit the movie onto a TV screen or within a 
two-hour TV time slot).25 7  It fits the definition of "chutzpah" for the 
same studios to argue that they (as copyright owners) should be 
entrusted with protecting the moral rights of the director.258 
Third, any concern we might have about the reputation of the 
director being tarnished by a poorly-edited movie can be handled with 
an appropriate labeling requirement. 259 So long as the person using 
Clear Play or similar technology is aware that the software mask 
(whether customizable or not) has not been produced by the director 
or the studio, it seems unlikely that either would suffer any 
reputational harm. 
Fourth, we must remember that copyright is supposed to be for 
the benefit of the public, and that the benefit to the artist is supposed 
to be of secondary concern?60 If a segment of the public wishes to 
see movies with less sex, violence and foul language, it ought to be 
able to do so without having to submit to the "all or nothing" bargain 
offered by the studios?61 Since the editing is being done by private 
257. See Kauffman, supra note 252, at 75 1 ;  see generally Janine V. McNally, 
Congressional Limits on Technological Alterations to Film: The Public Interest and the Artists ' 
Moral Right, S HIGH TECH. L.J. 129, 1 32-35 ( 1 990). The DGA Basic Agreement attempts to 
limit these practices, providing that "Employer will endeavor to license films for network 
telecasting with no abridgment other than for [Network] Broadcast Standards and Practices 
reasons," DGA Basic Agreement, Article 7-509(b), and limiting the cuts that can be made for 
airline showings. DGA Basic Agreement, Article 7-509(f). However, changing the format of 
movies ("pan and scan") and editing for content is still commonplace. 
258. See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 255, at 37 ("On the whole, 
copyright law cannot function as an adequate moral right substitute. The copyright law's 
overriding concern for the copyright owner rather than the creator is a significant disadvantage 
for creators whose moral right interests conflict with the pecuniary interests of the copyright 
owners of their works."); Lemley, supra note 1 99, at 1 033-34. 
259. This was the approach originally taken in the United States with respect to the 
colorization of black-and-white motion pictures. In 1 988, Congress required that anyone 
distributing a "materially altered version" of a film on the National Film Registry had to meet 
certain labeling requirements. See National Film Preservation Act of 1 998, § 4, P.L. 1 00-446, 
1 02 Stat. 1 782 (formerly codified at 2 U.S.c. § 178c; repealed 1992). Similarly, the DGA Basic 
Agreement provides that "Employer may not identify any version of a theatrical motion 
picture . . .  as the 'Director's Cut' unless it has been so identified by the Director." DGA Basic 
Agreement, Article 7-5 18. By contrast, the use of the familiar pan-and-scan format disclaimer 
("This film has been modified from its original version. It has been formatted to fit your 
screen.") appears to be voluntary. 
260. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 4 1 7, 429 ( 1 984); 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 1 5 1 , 1 56 ( 1 975). 
26 1 .  See Loren, supra note 248, at 89 ("In the United States, copyright law is not intended 
to permit a copyright owner to control the manner in which her work is viewed."). 
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parties and not by the government, it cannot be said to constitute 
"censorship" of free expression. To the contrary, permitting Clear 
Play and similar technologies would allow multiple users to freely 
express what types of things they do or do not wish to see and hear. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's OpInIOn in Galoob is inherently self­
contradictory, as it states on the one hand that a derivative work does 
not need to be "fixed," but it holds on the other hand that a derivative 
work does need to be embodied in some "concrete or permanent 
form.,,2 62 This contradiction stems from the fact that although the 
statutory language does not appear to require fixation, reading the 
statutory language literally would render illegal merely imagining a 
modified version of a copyrighted work. This contradiction can be 
eliminated by recognizing that what Congress intended was to 
prohibit the public performance of an unfixed derivative work, as well 
as the reproduction, public distribution, public performance or public 
display of a fixed derivative work. Congress' intent can be fully 
implemented by holding that the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works is dependent upon, rather than independent of, the other four 
exclusive rights. The advantage of this interpretation is that it leaves 
all private performances of a derivative work, whether fixed or 
unfixed, outside the realm of copyright infringement. 
262. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
